About This Lecture
Is an inerrant Bible necessary for Christians to possess genuine theological knowledge? In this second lecture of the Sola Scriptura series, Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen examines the epistemological necessity of biblical inerrancy, arguing that without an entirely trustworthy Scripture, our claims to know theological truth lose their proper justification. Engaging the arguments of Clark Pinnock and Stephen Davis, Bahnsen explores the nature of knowledge, the warrant of Scripture, and the authority required to distinguish justified belief from mere assumption. He considers the relationship between the original biblical text and the Bibles available to us today, challenges attempts to defend only a limited or conditional form of inerrancy, and critiques the proposal that Scripture should be granted merely presumptive authority. Through illustrations such as the familiar confession “Jesus Loves Me,” Bahnsen develops the case that biblical authority is not an arbitrary starting point but essential to knowing God and understanding the world. The lecture concludes by examining the consequences of abandoning inerrancy and asking what authority unbelievers themselves rely upon when making claims about truth.
Table of Contents
- Introduction: Inerrancy and Epistemology[00:00]
- Pinnock’s Three Views: Liberal, Neo-Orthodox, Conservative[01:25]
- Biblical Authority as a Presuppositional Question[03:43]
- Pinnock and Davis on the Epistemological Argument[06:08]
- Thesis: Inerrancy Is Necessary for Theological Knowledge[12:15]
- What Scripture Says About Its Truth and Our Knowing[14:28]
- What Is Knowledge? Justified True Belief[20:30]
- “Jesus Loves Me”: The Warrant of Scripture[26:07]
- Justification Patterns and Source Sets[28:22]
- Screening, Further Warrant, and Epistemic Authority[31:08]
- Errancy and the Loss of Theological Justification[37:46]
- Davis’s Reply and the “Conditional Inerrancy” Objection[41:25]
- Autographic Text and Our Present Bibles[43:58]
- Is Inerrancy All-or-Nothing?[48:20]
- Davis’s Presumptive Authority for the Bible[49:32]
- Critique: Presumptive Authority Becomes Arbitrary[53:57]
- Without Inerrancy, Theological Knowledge Is Lost[56:33]
- Conclusion: From Know-Nothing Religion to Knowing Nothing[60:43]
- Q&A: Faith and Knowledge[61:40]
- Q&A: Correcting the Bible by Modern Findings[64:21]
- Closing: Unbelievers Also Need an Authority[66:36]
Scripture References
| Timestamp | Reference | What’s there |
|---|---|---|
| [14:57] | Psalm 119:160 | Bahnsen reads that the sum of God’s Word is true, as the first of several passages showing that the Bible claims to be a book of truths. |
| [14:57] | Proverbs 30:5 | Bahnsen reads that every word of God has proven true, in support of the Bible’s claim to truthfulness. |
| [14:57] | John 17:17 | Bahnsen reads “Thy word is true” as further evidence that the Bible presents itself as true and not as a book of errors. |
| [15:22] | Hebrews 4:13 | Cited for the point that all creatures are open before God’s eyes, so God sees everything and makes no mistakes. |
| [15:22] | Hebrews 6:18 | Cited for the point that God cannot lie, which Bahnsen combines with God’s full knowledge to conclude that what God says is true. |
| [15:22] | 2 Timothy 3:16 | Bahnsen reads that all Scripture is inspired, meaning exhaled by God, and argues that every assertion of Scripture must therefore be true. |
| [16:13] | 1 Timothy 2:4 | Cited with 2 Timothy 2:25 for the claim that those who repent and are saved come to a knowledge of the truth. |
| [16:13] | 2 Timothy 2:25 | Cited with 1 Timothy 2:4 for the same claim that repentance and salvation bring a knowledge of the truth. |
| [16:13] | 2 Peter 3:18 | Cited for the command to grow in the knowledge of the Lord, as part of the Bible’s teaching that believers can know. |
| [16:13] | 1 John 5:13 | Bahnsen reports that John wrote so that believers may know they have eternal life. |
| [16:13] | John 8:32 | Bahnsen reports Jesus’ teaching that those who abide in his word will know the truth and be set free. |
| [16:13] | 1 John 4:16 | Bahnsen reports John’s statement that believers have come to know and believe the love God has for them. |
| [16:13] | 1 John 5:20 | Bahnsen reports John’s declaration that the Son of God has given understanding so that we may know him who is true. |
| [17:12] | 1 John 3:2 | Cited as an example of a specific theological truth believers know, namely their future glorification. |
| [17:12] | 1 John 4:2 | Cited for the claim that believers know the Spirit of God and can thereby detect anti-Christian error. |
| [17:12] | 1 John 2:3 | Cited for knowing that we have come to know him. Bahnsen notes that believers know that they know, which indicates certainty. |
| [17:12] | 3 John 12 | Cited by Bahnsen as “the third epistle of John, verse 12” for the claim that believers know the apostolic witness is true. |
| [17:12] | Proverbs 22:21 | Allusion: Bahnsen says only that Proverbs speaks of knowing the certainty of the words of truth. The chapter and verse are inferred. |
| [17:54] | Acts 2:36 | Cited as a particular illustration: Peter says we are to know for certain that God has made Jesus both Lord and Christ by his resurrection. |
| [18:53] | Galatians 3:13 | Allusion: Bahnsen asks how we can know that Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us. The passage is inferred, since he gives no reference. |
| [18:53] | Romans 4:25 | Allusion: Bahnsen asks whether we can know with certainty that Christ was raised for our justification, “as Paul says in Romans.” He names the book only, so the chapter and verse are inferred. |
| [19:34] | Romans 6:23 | Allusion: Bahnsen offers “the wages of sin is death” as an example of a biblical assertion he will symbolize as P. He gives no reference, so the passage is inferred. |
| [49:32] | 2 Timothy 3:16 | Allusion: Bahnsen says Davis must deal with Paul’s statement that all Scripture is inspired, if he holds that some things in the Bible are erroneous and therefore not inspired. He gives no reference here; see the explicit citation at the earlier timestamp. |
| [65:53] | 2 Corinthians 5:7 | Allusion: Bahnsen says we walk by faith and not by sight, using it to describe believing what God has said when opposition remains. The passage is inferred, since he gives no reference. |
| [65:53] | Genesis 22 | Allusion: Bahnsen calls the faith of Abraham, who said that God told him to do it and that it is true even if Isaac must be raised from the dead, the true existentialism. The passage is inferred, since he gives no reference. |
Explore This Lecture Further
The study aids below are summaries prepared from this lecture. They are not Dr. Bahnsen’s own wording unless a phrase appears in quotation marks, and each statement about what he argues carries a timestamp so you can listen and check it.
Key Terms as Bahnsen Uses Them
These are the lecture’s working terms, described as Bahnsen uses them here rather than as a philosophy textbook might.
| Timestamp | Term | In this lecture |
|---|---|---|
| [00:43] | Epistemology | The theory of knowledge: what knowing requires, how we know what we know, and how knowledge claims are justified. |
| [03:43] | Control belief | A belief held so tenaciously that we keep it almost to the end. Bahnsen, following Pinnock, treats biblical authority as a question about one’s control beliefs, which is why he calls it presuppositional. |
| [12:52] [25:30] | Knowledge | Belief that is true and held with justification or good evidence. Bahnsen says biblical knowledge is at least this, and possibly more ([18:10], [18:53]). |
| [19:34] | Warrant (justification) | The evidence or grounds a person can offer when asked how he knows a particular claim. |
| [19:34] | P | Bahnsen’s symbol for any single theological assertion taken from the Bible. |
| [28:22] [29:12] | Justification pattern (source set) | Supporting a claim by appeal to a source or set of truths, such as perception, memory, or an encyclopedia. |
| [31:08] [31:55] | Screening procedure / further warrant | What an imperfect justification pattern needs: a way to detect its false claims, or added confirmation of its true ones. Bahnsen says the two are often the same procedure. |
| [33:45] | Hierarchy of epistemic authorities | If a pattern can be corrected by something else, that something else is the higher standard. |
| [37:07] [51:56] | Presumptive authority | Authority granted to a set of claims because many of its members have been confirmed, so the rest are presumed true. At [51:56] Bahnsen describes the status Davis wants for the Bible. |
| [07:52] | Infallibility (Davis’s term) | Davis affirms the Bible’s infallibility while denying its inerrancy. This lecture does not define the term further. |
| [45:47] | Autographic text and codex | The text is the words written on the original manuscripts; the codex is the manuscript itself. Bahnsen says inerrancy is restricted to the text, so losing the manuscripts does not automatically mean losing the text. |
| [42:44] [43:24] | Conditional inerrancy | The objection that Bahnsen’s position leaves only a conditional claim: if a statement is taught in the Bible, then it is true. He accepts the conditional and says the conditions are natural ones. |
The Argument at a Glance
A summary of the lecture’s argument in sequence. The steps are the study aid’s wording, not Bahnsen’s.
- Scripture says it is true and says believers can and do know theological truths. [14:28] [16:13]
- Bahnsen assumes that biblical knowledge is at least justified true belief. [18:10] [18:53]
- Knowledge is true belief held on good evidence, so a claim to know P calls for a warrant. [25:30]
- The traditional evangelical warrant is that P is known because the Bible teaches P. [26:07] [27:31]
- An imperfect justification pattern cannot stand alone. It needs a screening procedure or further warrant, which implies a higher epistemic authority. [31:08] [33:45]
- Such a set can then serve only as a source of hypotheses to test one by one, or gain presumptive authority through inductive confirmation. [35:19] [37:07]
- If Scripture errs, it becomes an imperfect set of this kind, and P’s presence in the Bible no longer justifies P. [38:55]
- Theological claims would then need a higher authority outside Scripture. Bahnsen concludes we could not know them on the basis of sola scriptura, and could not know them at all. [39:38]
- He applies the argument to Davis’s weaker view of knowledge and to Davis’s proposal of presumptive authority. [41:47] [53:57]
- He concludes that denying inerrancy leads to religious agnosticism, and, given his view that revelation is a precondition of logic and experience, to knowing nothing at all. [58:58] [61:40]
Pinnock, Davis, and Bahnsen Compared
Each row reports a position as Bahnsen presents it in the lecture, including his own responses.
| Timestamp | Position | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| [01:49] | Pinnock: the liberal view | Selective toward the Bible, and willing to let modern worldviews correct what it teaches. |
| [02:15] | Pinnock: the neo-orthodox view | Locates revelation in man’s experience of faith and grafts biblical views onto an essentially secular understanding of reality. |
| [02:56] | Pinnock: the conservative evangelical view | Listens to Scripture even when it offends the modern mind, and reforms the modern view rather than the Word of God. |
| [06:08] | Pinnock on the epistemological argument | Calls the argument very doubtful, holding that religious certainty would survive a flaw in Scripture and that one can hold a high view of inspiration without inerrancy. |
| [07:52] | Davis on inerrancy | Affirms the Bible’s infallibility but not its inerrancy. |
| [09:40] | Pinnock’s version of the argument | As Bahnsen reports it, Pinnock portrays the argument as: one flaw destroys religious certainty and invalidates the whole Bible. |
| [10:51] | Davis’s four versions | (1) The Bible might err anywhere, so it is unreliable anywhere. (2) An errant Bible cannot be authoritative for faith and practice. (3) An errant Bible needs a superior outside criterion, which is unchristian. (4) Without inerrancy there is no sure guarantee of other Christian beliefs. |
| [11:31] | Bahnsen’s response to Davis’s handling | Davis says the answer to one version is the answer to all. Bahnsen says logically distinct versions need separate answers, and offers a version he thinks neither man has refuted. |
| [41:47] | Davis on certainty | Certainty is available only in logic and mathematics, but doctrines can still be known in a weaker sense, with good reasons. Bahnsen replies that Davis could then know them only by judging each one in isolation by a higher authority. |
Bahnsen’s Illustrations and What Each One Shows
Bahnsen builds the argument largely through everyday examples. This table pairs each with the point he uses it to make.
| Timestamp | Illustration | What it shows in the argument |
|---|---|---|
| [21:03] [21:39] | The moon of green cheese and Monday evening | Knowledge is a kind of belief, but not every belief is knowledge, and what is false cannot be known. |
| [22:27] | The killer bee count | A lucky guess that turns out true is still not knowledge. |
| [23:21] | Roy Rogers, the stopped clock, and the misremembered liar | A true belief held for poor reasons is not knowledge, so good evidence is required. |
| [26:07] [26:41] | The hymn “Jesus Loves Me” | The familiar warranting pattern: “I know P, for the Bible tells me P.” |
| [28:22] [29:12] | The Golden Gate Bridge, the Britannica, and Sam’s phone number from Ray’s address book | Claims are warranted by appeal to a source set, and an imperfect set does not by itself warrant knowledge. |
| [31:55] [32:51] | Checking the directory, calling the operator, dialing the number | A screening procedure or further warrant is needed, and it reveals a higher epistemic authority. |
| [35:19] | A notoriously faulty encyclopedia | Each member of an imperfect set must be justified one by one. |
| [46:36] [47:09] | Plato’s manuscripts compared with the Gospel of John | Bahnsen contrasts a gap of about seven centuries for Plato with a gap he puts at perhaps forty years for John, and argues that losing manuscripts does not mean losing the text. He adds that he does not claim we have it infallibly at every point. |
| [48:20] | Churchill’s Gathering Storm, and baldness and warmth | One error does not make every point false but makes every point less reliable, and some predicates apply in degrees. |
| [65:37] | The Hittites | Bahnsen says apparent conflicts with history have been resolved by later archaeological finds. |
| [65:53] | Abraham | Bahnsen calls it true existentialism to believe because God said it, even when opposition remains. |
Presumptive Authority: The Proposal and the Critique
Bahnsen’s critique is aimed at a specific proposal, Davis’s, and concerns whether that status can be affirmed without arbitrariness. It is not a claim that Christians simply assume the Bible’s authority without argument.
| Timestamp | Stage | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| [49:32] | Davis’s position | As Bahnsen presents it, Davis holds that the Bible is not free of error, yet its truth can be seen in certain propositions, so it remains authoritative. Bahnsen says this forces a choice between inspired Scripture that errs and error that is not inspired, and he asks how that fits Paul’s statement that all Scripture is inspired. |
| [51:56] | What presumptive authority would mean | The Bible would be generally reliable, so each claim is not weighed in isolation, and it could function as an authority even where its own say-so is the only evidence. |
| [52:26] | A test case | Bahnsen says he knows of no way to justify Christ’s intercession except that the Bible teaches it. Davis would reply that the Bible can be tested in some areas, such as the life of Christ, the resurrection, and miracles. |
| [53:57] | The question | Why should Davis grant presumptive authority at all? Bahnsen expects the answer that God said these things and is always correct. |
| [54:43] | The rub | If God’s word is not always correct, even presumptive authority cannot be affirmed non-arbitrarily, because one would first have to confirm theological claims independently. |
| [55:18] | Where has God spoken? | A negative test, rejecting what is found false, is not enough, since a proposition can be false without having been shown false. |
| [55:57] | No evidence to generalize from | Given the Bible’s diverse segments, writers, and eras, and its supernatural subject matter, Bahnsen says presumptive authority is not reasonable if not even one theological claim can be confirmed. |
| [56:33] [57:08] | Result | Bahnsen says non-arbitrary religious knowledge and certainty are destroyed, not religious truth or belief. The Bible becomes only a source of hypotheses, which in his view cannot be squared with sola scriptura. |
Objections and Bahnsen’s Replies
The objections Bahnsen takes up, including those from the question period, each paired with his reply.
| Timestamp | Objection | Bahnsen’s reply |
|---|---|---|
| [42:44] | Inerrancy is only conditional: it applies only if a statement is taught in the Bible, so we must still ask about the original manuscripts, the canon, and interpretation. | He accepts the conditional. In [43:24] he says inerrancy was never meant to replace that work, and that the conditions are natural to any intelligent commitment to God’s Word. |
| [43:58] [45:13] | Inerrancy restricted to the autographic text leaves present Bibles untrustworthy, so why the fuss over error? | The objection confuses text with codex ([45:47]). Textual criticism confirms the text to a high degree ([46:36]), and the Plato comparison makes the point ([47:09]). |
| [48:20] | If one point is mistaken, every point is mistaken. | Not so. One error makes every point less reliable but not false, and he says inerrant and inspired can apply in degrees ([49:32]). |
| [61:40] | The Bible gives a moral premium to faith, not to knowing for certain. The question begins partway through this paragraph. | Yes, but what is believed by faith is also known, because God is the source ([63:17]). He says the emphasis on faith is also an emphasis on knowledge ([63:48]). |
| [64:21] | Must one hold to the Bible even against clear and sufficient evidence? | He says the only evidence that can be brought against God’s Word is apparent evidence, which study of science, history, and the text can harmonize ([65:06], [65:53]). |
| [66:36] | Anticipated: this is a problem only for Christians. | Bahnsen says unbelievers also rely on epistemological authorities, and that they face a further problem if logic and science cannot be used without a biblical worldview. He says this is not proven in the lecture ([67:24], [68:12]). |
Full Transcript
[00:00] This restored recording is brought to you by the Bahnsen Bible Academy.
[00:04] I’m very respectful of the show this evening, and how are we being with you? It’s been a great privilege, and I hope, even though you have to forgive me for forgetting your names, that I’ll get to meet more of you individually and get a chance to chat. Thank you again for the invitation.
[00:20] Tonight’s lecture is going to be something of a combination of philosophical apologetics and some rather hardcore theological considerations. And it’s about a subject which is of great importance in the evangelical world today, a subject that has been misunderstood in many places and by many people in many ways, a subject of biblical inerrancy.
[00:43] I think if we reflect on the necessities of the epistemology, if we think epistemology, what’s that guy talking about up here? The epistemology is the theory of knowledge. if you aren’t inclined in philosophical direction, if that’s right, you’re majored here. Epistemology considers what the requirements of knowledge are, how we know what we know, if we know what we know, how we justify these things, what we mean by notions like belief and knowledge, truth, those sorts of matters. And what I’m suggesting is if we will look at epistemology from a Christian perspective, we’ll see that holding to the inerrancy of Scripture is absolutely necessary.
[01:25] In 1977, Word Books published a book edited by Jack Rogers entitled Biblical Authority. In it, Clark Pinnock has written an article entitled Three Views of the Bible in Contemporary Theology, in which he surveys and reacts to the liberal, the neo-orthodox, and the conservative evangelical viewpoints on the Bible.
[01:49] Now, Pinnock characterizes the liberal approach to biblical authority as selective. The liberal comes to the Bible, and he selects those things that he thinks are appropriate and interjects those things he deems inappropriate. The liberal looks at the Bible as not beyond correct. Modern worldviews may be used to correct the worldview presented in the Bible and various things that are taught in the Bible.
[02:15] On the other hand, the neo-orthodox approach to the Bible, says Pinnock, The neo-orthodox approach makes man’s experience of faith, the location of revelation, ending up by grafting biblical views onto what is basically a secular understanding of reality. The neo-Orthodox takes man’s experience of faith, this internal experience of coming to know the Lord, and then grasps that onto what is a view of reality available to people outside of biblical restraints and foundations as well. So you take a second review of life and you add to it this experience of faith.
[02:56] Now, Pinnock tells us that the third approach, the conservative evangelical approach, says we should listen to Scripture, and we should listen to Scripture even when it offends our modern mentality, even when it challenges us. The keynote of the conservative approach is that when the Bible speaks, we bow the head and say, yes, Lord. Of course, that’s a very hard thing for 20th century men to do. That kind of humble attitude is not fostered on all sides around about us. But the conservative says, if the Bible conflicts with what I take to be a modern view of life, then the modern view of life must be reformed, and not vice versa. We will reform every aspect of life according to the Word of God, rather than reforming the Word of God by these various aspects of life.
[03:43] In all three cases, Pinnock’s insight, it seems to me, is that the problem of biblical inerrancy, the problem of biblical authority, is presuppositional in character. It’s the question of what one takes as his final authority, what we might call what one takes as his control belief. We all have a web of beliefs, a large web of beliefs, all the way from, I believe it’s Monday evening, and such trivial things as I think the birds are chirping outside, if that’s what we happen to be hearing, or think we are hearing, to more important things that are religious in nature. I believe in God. I believe in final judgment or things of that nature.
[04:31] Now, among this large range of beliefs, we find certain ones that are the stick beliefs, the ones that we stick with no matter what, or at least we stick with them almost to the end or all the way to the end. That is, we hold on to them. And we are tenacious about them in a way that we aren’t with others. In fact, there’s a large gradation when it comes to this tenacity about our belief.
[04:56] If I think I hear birds chirping outside and then some kind of counter-evidence is presented to me, I don’t find it difficult to give that up. If somebody presents evidence that there is no God, I hold on for dear life. So there are controlled beliefs, those beliefs which are foundational, those beliefs which we will call presuppositional in tonight’s lecture. And what Pinnock is telling us is that this question of biblical authority is a presuppositional question. What are our control beliefs when it comes to the Bible?
[05:28] Now, my narrow interest in this paper is with a series of questions which Pinnock says must be seriously considered and answered by those who wish to defend biblical inerrancy. And I’m glad to tell you tonight that I am a defender of biblical inerrancy. I don’t say that with pride, I say that only because of the grace of God, but it’s a grace of God that keeps you humble, hopefully bold, and humble if it’s been done. I wish to say that the Bible is the word of God, and that it is without error in what it features. Now, Pinnock says, if you hold that kind of belief, as unpopular as it may be in the 20th century, then there are some questions you’re going to have to ask and answer.
[06:08] Having assailed many evangelicals, and are quite vague, and I think metaphorical, perhaps emotive manner for over-belief about the Bible and attempting to soften the contours of its text, not doing justice to the human side of the Bible. Pinnock sets forth seven critical questions posed by those who aren’t satisfied with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. He says these questions cannot be ignored. Time requires, however, that I ignore all but one of them, and I would insist that my response to that one question, namely is inerrancy and epistemological necessity, is but one answer to Pinnock’s question. I don’t think that I’ve cornered the market when it comes to answering the sort of thing, but I do have something to suggest in reply to this one question, but I hope it’s worth hearing. There might be many other avenues by which one could approach the question and reply to it, but tonight I’ll give you my own. In his article, Pinnock asserts that it is obvious that the argument based on epistemology, the argument in favor of biblical inerrancy based on epistemology, is itself very doubtful. And by that he means that religious certainty would not be destroyed if a flaw were to exist in Scripture, that errorlessness is not deemed epistemologically crucial by God, and that one can have a very high and strong view of the inspiration and authority of the Bible without believing that it’s without error. He also means that the authority of the Bible does not stand or fall on questions as to whether the disciples carried one or two staff, or whether there are rabbits that chew the cud. Notorious, detailed problems for those holding to biblical inerrancy.
[07:52] Do you get the point? Pinnock is saying you can believe in biblical authority even though you don’t believe in biblical inerrancy. Now this particular question of whether scriptural inerrancy is an epistemological necessity, has been given added importance by the publication of Stephen Davis’s book, The Debate About the Bible, Westminster Press, 1977, in which he straightforwardly criticizes the inerrancy of the Bible and argues for infallibility instead. He says, I believe in the infallibility of the Bible, but not the inerrancy of the Bible.
[08:26] Davis isolates the three common arguments that are advanced for inerrancy by evangelical writers, and he rejects each one in turn, takes each one of these up and then knocks it down. He labels these arguments, the biblical argument for inerrancy, the epistemological argument for inerrancy, the subject of tonight’s talk, and the slippery slope argument for inerrancy. That’s the second one that I’m concerned about, and it’s the second question that underscores the importance of Pinnock’s own question, is inerrancy an epistemological necessity? All the more since it turns out that Clark Pinnock wrote the introduction to Stephen Davis’ book, an interesting combination of facts, isn’t it?
[09:09] You should be aware of the fact, before we continue, however, that Pinnock and Davis, although they, in a sense, are complement, support each other, nevertheless conceive of the epistemological argument for biblical inerrancy quite differently. They have different conceptions of that argument. Pinnock, for instance, says, he is trying to portray what allegedly is our argument or my argument for the inerrancy of Scripture on the basis of the epistemological necessity. He says the argument goes like this.
[09:40] If a flaw were to exist in Scripture, religious certainty would be destroyed. If there were one flaw in the Bible, then no religious certainty. He portrays me as saying if the Bible is mistaken on a single point, we can’t believe the Bible at all. We can’t believe the Bible at all. Unless every point can be established, the entire edifice will come crashing down, according to those who argue in this way, claims Pinnock. And one single error, and even a tiny detail of Scripture will invalidate the full Bible. Its inspiration will open the floodgate to Bible-denying theories, to liberalism, ultimately to apostasy. So that the authority of the Bible stands where it falls on every detail. It’s true.
[10:25] Davis, on the other hand, doesn’t portray the argument in that light at all. His basic idea is that unless the Bible is inerrant, Christians have no sound epistemological foundation on which to base their beliefs. And there are distinct versions of this argument, he says, ones which are not carefully distinguished, even as Pinnock has not carefully distinguished them. They seldom are. But the different forms of this argument will be the following.
[10:51] Somebody could say, the Bible might err in any passage, and since it might err anywhere, it’s not reliable anywhere. Or secondly, somebody would say, if the Bible is errant, if it makes mistakes, it cannot be authoritative for faith and practice. That seems to be Pinnock’s understanding of the argument. Thirdly, a person might say, the Bible requires an extra-biblical criterion that’s superior to itself if it makes mistakes, And that’s an unchristian attitude to hold. Or finally, somebody might argue, if the Bible is errant, then we have no sure guarantee of other Christian beliefs either.
[11:31] Now, it turns out that although Davis does a commendable job of distinguishing the logically different versions of this argument, he does nothing to handle them on a separate basis. He says, in fact, and I quote, since each easily flows in and out of the others, the answer to one is the answer to all. But that isn’t true, is it? If they are logically distinct, to answer one is only to answer one. There’s no logical connection between refuting one version of the argument and refuting others. Well, the point tonight, however, is that I have a version of the argument which neither Pinnock nor Davis turn out to have refuted, and it may be that it can be refuted and rebutted. I’ll give you a few minutes to ask questions about it as we get done, but I think that it’s worth consideration.
[12:15] I do think there is an epistemological necessity for biblical inerrancy. I’d like you to follow along with me tonight as I lay that before you. First of all, I want to say that inerrancy is necessary in order to know any theological truth that is revealed in Scripture. I noticed some of you are taking notes, so since that’s such a key point, let me repeat it for you. Inerrancy is necessary in order to know any theological truth revealed in Scripture. You must underline that word know, as you’ll see in just a moment, that’s crucial. Inerrancy is necessary in order to know any theological truth revealed in Scripture.
[12:52] Why? Well, in the first place, because knowledge is justified true belief. What do we mean by the word knowledge or the verb to know? We mean somebody holds a belief, that it’s a true belief, and that it’s held with justification or with good evidence.
[13:11] For 25 centuries, the problem of human understanding, namely of recognizing the basis of intellectual authority, has been an enduring preoccupation and a permanent feature of man’s speculative thought. There are typical epistemological questions and critical issues in deciding how we are to reflectively picture ourselves when we think of ourselves as knowers, how we are to settle on an intellectual process, how we are to settle on an intellectual procedure. These questions ask not, what do we know? They ask, how do we know? Especially, has there been an interest in pursuing the goal of non-arbitrariness for those who have studied epistemology? People want to eliminate personal prejudice. They want to eliminate unreasoning conjecture. They want to eliminate distorting bias from their beliefs. And so they get engaged in epistemological discussions.
[14:10] And it seems to me that that’s reflected in recent efforts in epistemology by the fact that the field is pretty much concentrated these days on the whole issue of the justification of knowledge claim. That is really the central notion in epistemology today. How do you justify a claim to knowledge?
[14:28] Now, in conjunction with such questions, would you notice that the Scripture teaches us that we can and that we do know the theological truths which are revealed in the Bible. The Scripture tells us that we know certain things if we are believers. In fact, the Bible teaches us that it itself is without error. That would be one of the things we could know if we could know the truths of the Scripture.
[14:57] Psalm 119, 160 says, The sum of thy word is true. Proverbs 30, verse 5 says, Every word of God has proven true. And of course, in John 17, 17, we read, Thy word is true. So the Bible claims to be a book full of truths, not a book full of errors, not a book of misleading remarks or personal opinions, but a book of truths.
[15:22] Hebrews 4, verse 13 tells us that God is in a position to not make any mistakes, because before the eyes of God, every creature is open. God sees everything. According to Hebrews 6, 18, God cannot lie. And so if God sees everything and God cannot lie, it only stands to reason that what God says is going to be true. And 2 Timothy 3, 16 says, Every scripture is God’s breathed word. All scripture is inspired of God, which means it is exhaled by God. It is what God says. And so if every scripture we find in the Bible is God’s Word, and God sees everything, and God cannot lie, it stands to reason that every scripture that asserts things is going to be true, even as these other passages are said.
[16:13] Okay, so the Bible claims to be true, and it claims that we can know the truth. Here are some of the things it says in this regard. When men repent and are saved, they come to, quote, a knowledge of the truth. 1 Timothy 2.4 and 2 Timothy 2.25. Indeed, they are commanded to grow in knowledge, the knowledge of the Lord, 2 Peter 3.18. When John wrote his first epistle, it was in order that you may know that you have eternal life, 1 John 5.13. Jesus taught that if we abide in his word, we shall know the truth and it shall set us free, John 8.32. And John insists, we have come to know and have believed the love which God has for us, 1 John 4.16. And he further declares, we know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding in order that we might know Him who is true, 1 John 5.20.
[17:12] Moreover, we know specific theological truths, for instance, about our future glorification. 1 John 3, 2 says we know of these things, and we know the Spirit of God, and thereby can detect anti-Christian error. 1 John 4, 2. And we know that we have come to know Him. It’s an interesting expression. Epistemologically significant. Not only do we know certain things, but we know that we know certain things. There’s a kind of certainty about it. 1 John 2, verse 3. We know that the apostolic witness is true. The third epistle of John, verse 12. And in listening to God’s revelation, Proverbs says we know the certainty of the words of truth.
[17:54] I’ll give you one particular illustration here. Peter says that we are to know for certain that God has made Jesus Lord and Christ by his resurrection. Acts 2 verse 36. And thus, I could go on and on and on, but you get the point by now.
[18:10] there is a persistent biblical teaching that we can and do know theological truths that are revealed in God’s Word. Indeed, we can know them as certain. Of course, the claim doesn’t make it the case, but the Bible says that it’s true, and the Bible says we can know the truths that are presented therein. Now, I’m going to assume tonight that knowledge, that the word knowledge and the verb to know when they are used in the Bible are not radically, categorically different concepts than this standard everyday garden variety concept of knowledge that I’ve called justified true belief. Now, I do believe knowledge in the Bible is more than that.
[18:53] My only point tonight, and the only crucial point for my presentation, is that it is at least that, justified true belief. So then, given the central questions of epistemology, and given the goal of epistemology. And given that these biblical truths about our knowledge are as I’ve said they are, we need to go on and ask the obvious question, how can we know, for instance, the statements of the Bible? How can we know what the Bible says? The Bible says Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us. How can we know that? Can we know with certainty that Christ was raised for our justification, as Paul says in Romans?
[19:34] Such questions as these ask after the warrant for our theological beliefs and the nature of that warrant. When asked whether we know these theological assertions, these biblical propositions about God and his relation to man, which are believed and are set forth as true, we are being asked for the justification for the evidence that we have for them. And for our purposes now, as I continue this paper, any such theological assertion that comes from the Bible can be considered. The Bible says God is one. The Bible says the wages of sin is death and on and on and on. And we will symbolize any particular assertion of the Bible hereafter as P. Standing for premise if you want or proposition. So anytime I say P hereafter that will stand for any of the whatever proposition or premise you want to keep in your mind as long as it’s a biblical one. Okay?
[20:30] Now, we need to ask about the nature of knowledge if we’re going to answer the question, how do we know that P? Somebody says, now, you believe Christ was raised from the dead? You believe that P? How? How do you know that? Well, if I don’t know what knowledge is, I’m not even going to be able to begin to answer that question. So let’s ask ourselves now, what is knowledge? Well, in the first place, it’s obvious that knowledge is a kind of belief, isn’t it? All instances of knowledge are instances of belief. They’re, in fact, a subclass of the instances of belief.
[21:03] Okay, now let’s say I believe the moon is made out of green cheese. I also believe that it’s Monday evening. And I believe X, Y, Z. We can go on and on and on. Now, all those things are genuinely believed. I would operate on those things. I would guide my life on that basis. if it’s Monday evening, the moon is made of green cheese, etc., etc. As you can see, out of the circle of all of those beliefs, some of them are going to be knowledgeable and some are not. So my first point is that knowledge is a kind of belief.
[21:39] Well, now, what makes the difference between tonight is Monday night and the moon is made out of green cheese? What distinguishes these beliefs? All of them are beliefs, but not all of them are knowledgeable. Well, knowledge is more than belief. For if we admit that P is false, we indicate that nobody can know that P. Although they may think that they know it, they may say that they know it, they may genuinely believe that they know it, but they can’t know those things which are false. I may believe that San Francisco is south of Los Angeles, but I can’t know that. I can only believe it and act like a fool. And yet, knowledge is not merely true belief either. You know, somebody might say, well, no, wait a minute. Those things I know are all those beliefs which are true. The beliefs I have which are true beliefs. But that’s not good enough either.
[22:27] For you see, those beliefs that I have, even the ones that turn out to be true, can be somewhat arbitrary, somewhat accidental. What if I were to tell you tonight that I believe that there are 6,423,209 killer bees in South America? and then there was assuming some way to count them and somebody does a count and calls us up and says you know what there are dot dot dot number of bees and I turn out to be right now by no stretch of the imagination would you say oh Dr. Bahnsen knew how many killer bees there were in South America no you’d say well that was a lucky guess there was a hunch he didn’t know it even if he believed it and even if it was true he didn’t know it and so at first sight it might seem that if we believe what is in fact true then we have knowledge
[23:21] but this is not the sense in which the word is commonly used the definition of knowledge as true belief just turns out to be too broad true conclusions can be drawn by invalid means or drawn from false premises they can be based on very poor grounds indeed i’ll give you some other instances suppose a man believe that the president name the present president’s name began with the letter R. But he also believed this because he thought that Roy Rogers was the present president of the United States. Now he would believe something that is true, that the present president has the first letter of his last name R. But he would believe it for very bad reasons, and we would say he didn’t know it after all. What he believes is in fact true, yet no one would say he knew that the president’s name began with R. Then again, let us say that you look at a clock which you believe to be running but which in fact has stopped and you happen to look at it at just the moment when it so happens that the hands are pointing to the correct time i don’t think anybody would uh you would acquire a true belief at the time by looking at the clock and saying oh i see that it is such and such a time but nobody would say that you knew that it was that time because you were relying on poor evidence now you might believe something you might misremember something, the testimony of a notorious liar. And just because you happen to misremember what the liar said, you might get it right in the end, but you wouldn’t have good reasons for what you believe. Okay, so we conclude that knowledge is a subclass of true beliefs, and every case of knowledge is a case of true belief, but not every true belief is a case of knowledge. And it’s easy to indefinitely give examples of true beliefs that are not knowledgeable beliefs and what they show us is that you cannot claim to have knowledge merely because you turn out to be right the character in addition to truth that a belief must have if it’s going to count as a knowledgeable belief is substantiation by good evidence knowledge is true belief held on good evidence all right for you note takers that’s something you should write down okay
[25:30] i’ll try to stop my foot every time we get to one of those crucial premises all right Knowledge is true belief held on good evidence. We now see that with respect to the theological assertions of Scripture, when a believer is challenged, how do you know that P? He is expected to offer good evidence for P. He is being asked to supply evidence if it’s true. Okay, so now the moment of truth for us comes, the moment of reckoning. What then is the warranting procedure for those theological assertions, which, as Scripture says, we can and do know as Christians.
[26:07] The words of a well-known children’s hymn are both popular and profound. And I think they are near to the heart of every true child of God, whatever his age may be. The hymn says, Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so. Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so. You know, there’s a sharply delineated epistemology in that children’s hymn. There’s a very clear warranting procedure in that children’s hymn.
[26:41] And if you wonder why we’re talking about children’s hymns this morning, we don’t become a little more sophisticated and talk adult stuff. It’s because I’m afraid that the modern theological world perhaps has not gotten beyond even that elementary lesson. Look at that epistemology. Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible, tells me so. Quite simply and sufficiently, a theological assertion is said to be warranted on the ground that it’s taught in the Bible. To restate the line, it amounts to this, I know P, for the Bible tells me P. Or, if you wish, because P is included in the set of scriptural assertions, it is said to be justified, true belief, and therefore it’s known. The basis for the claim to no P is that it has scriptural justification, that it’s evidenced in the Bible.
[27:31] Now, this is an obvious pattern for warranting theological beliefs. It’s the obvious pattern that’s been used throughout the history of evangelical Protestantism, certainly since the times of the Protestant Reformation. And it’s this pattern that I think is, in fact, warranted by the Scripture itself. Scripture uses just that warranting procedure. But now, before we go on, we need to add another insight here. We’ve been talking about warranting procedures and patterns in epistemology, and our next observation is that an imperfect justification pattern for knowledge claims entails its insufficiency and the recognition, finally, of a higher epistemic authority. An imperfect justification pattern for knowledge claims entails its insufficiency and eventually the recognition of a higher epistemic authority.
[28:22] When a claim to knowledge is to be warranted, it is customary for people to appeal to sources of truth or sets of truths. For instance, a traveler says, I know the Golden Gate Bridge is orangish red, for I saw it with my own eyes. Or somebody says, I know that Grove City is 14 miles wide because I read about it in the Encyclopedia Britannica. In actuality, appeals to a source of truths is itself an appeal to a set of truths, that is, that set of truths in the illustration given, which are disclosed by perception. And appeals to sets of truths are ultimately appeals to sources of truths, for instance, those sources on which the encyclopedia authors drew.
[29:12] And thus the warrant or the justification of a knowledge claim will be in terms of a source set. That is, particular assertions will be warranted in epistemology in terms of a justification pattern, in terms of a set or a source of truths that is more general than that particular claim itself. So, if I can expand on previous illustrations, we would say, I know the proposition, the Golden Gate Bridge is orangish red, because it is among the set of perceived truths. Or somebody might say, I know the proposition that Grove City is 14 miles wide, for it is among the set of truths presented in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Of course, there are good and not so good justification patterns used for knowledge claims. Consider the following instance. Somebody says, I know that Sam’s phone number is 791-5644, for I remember seeing it in Ray’s address book 10 years ago. Now in this case, people are not generally prone to grant reliability to this justification pattern. The set of truths in Ray’s address book has proven to be less than accurate, and the truth source of memory is notoriously faulty. Yet on the other hand, Ray’s book does have much correct information, indeed even some information that’s hard to find otherwise, and memory is not totally wrong at every point, so perhaps one does believe truly that Sam’s phone number is 7915644, but one does not know that Sam’s phone number is that until his insufficient justification pattern has been improved upon. The set of propositions remembered from Ray’s phone book is not wholly true, and thus appeal to such an imperfect source of information will not in itself warrant a knowledge claim.
[31:08] Something more must be done to justify the claim that you know that Sam’s number is 7915644. One must either have some screening procedure that would detect the false claims among the set of propositions remembered from Ray’s book, or one must have some further warrant for confirming the true claims among that set. What I’m saying here is that if you use a justification pattern for your knowledge claims that is an imperfect pattern, you’re going to have to add to that either a screening procedure so that when you use the pattern, you can now screen out the ones that shouldn’t be appealed to, or a further warrant by which you can give double justification or reconfirmation, if you will, of the proposition that you’re appealing to.
[31:55] Now, oftentimes, screening procedure or further warrant can be one and the same. For instance, checking the remembered phone number against the directory, or calling the information operator, or dialing the number in a pragmatic test to find out if that really is Sam’s number or not. The simple appeal to memory, memory of Ray’s phone book, will not in itself be sufficient to justify the belief, even if it happens to be true that Sam’s number is 7915644, and thus it constitutes a case of knowing. The fact that some discriminating and or confirming procedure must be applied beyond the justification pattern of appealing to that set of propositions remembered in Ray’s book indicates that there is an epistemic authorization or an epistemic standard that is ranked in a hierarchy above the present warranting procedure?
[32:51] You say, what is Sam’s phone number? The answer I give is, well, his number is 791-5644. You say, how do you know that? I remember it from Ray’s book 10 years ago. You say, well, I want a little bit more than that. You know what that tells me about you? That tells me about you that you consider something to have a higher epistemic authority than my memory of Ray’s book from 10 years ago. And there’s a hierarchy there, implicit to be sure, but a hierarchy. When my memory of the number as found in Ray’s book conflicts with what the information operator says, then I usually conclude that the remembered number is wrong. And when the information operator conflicts with what I directly see in the directory, I suppose that she has misread the book. And when I call the number that conflicts with the directory and it still reaches Sam, the intended party, I consider the possibility there’s been a misprint in the telephone book.
[33:45] You see, there is this hierarchy of authorities. The insufficiency of a warranting procedure for a proposition that appeals to inclusion of that proposition and a set of propositions, like remembered propositions and raised phone book, will entail a hierarchy of epistemic authorities with the insufficient warranting procedure that is under consideration, not being deemed supreme. Indeed, the very fact this justification pattern can be discerned as faulty and inadequate indicates that this warrant is less authoritative than some other standard. For one must have a standard against which error can be detected. You’re not able to tell me how many inches a device is unless you have some yardstick against which to measure. And the fact that a justification pattern is qualified and corrected at points indicates its position as a lesser authority.
[34:41] We’ve seen then that the justification of a belief as a case of knowledge calls for appealing to the fact that the believed proposition is included in or is a member of a set source of propositions. It is an instance of a generally authorized set of propositions. However, the set to which appeal is made in justification patterns for knowledge claims is usually broader in scope than those propositions which are true, broader in scope than what actually and sufficiently qualifies as warranted true propositions. The imperfection of this set thus requires its qualification and its supplementation.
[35:19] It will implicitly call for a screening procedure, I said, for the false proposition, or a further warrant for the true propositions, and finally, a hierarchy of epistemic authorities or standards. And what this means is that it will not be sufficient for one to justify a claim to no P simply in virtue of P’s inclusion in the allegedly warranting set of propositions. The insufficiency and the fallibilism of that set will require, now we go further, will require that each member of the set receive further consideration in isolation from the others. If I appeal to the Encyclopedia Britannica, but it turns out that’s a notoriously faulty source of information, then I can only appeal to the Encyclopedia Britannica when I justify the propositions therein one by one, piecemeal fashion. I can’t say there’s this general package deal that you get in the Encyclopedia Britannica. And so that means that every proposition stands or falls on its own now, and it means further that confidence can be rebuilt in that set through inductive confirmation of many of its members and then generalization to cover the set.
[36:30] I don’t want to go too fast here. I know some of this is perhaps unfamiliar with you, but that’s why I’m using these mundane illustrations to make the point rather clear. I’m saying that if you have an imperfect justification pattern, you need a screening procedure or a further warrant and certainly a hierarchy of epistemic authorities. And those three things, in turn, will require that each member of that set will receive consideration in isolation and that confidence will be rebuilt in the set only through inductive generalization. I look one by one and say, well, it was right in this case, it was right in this case, it was right in this case. Very likely it’s right in the next case.
[37:07] That is, at this point, the justification pattern with its warranting set of propositions will either become a fruitful source or beginning point for hypotheses to be considered and tested one by one, or it will be made over into what I will call a presumptive authority, inductive generalization it’s been true so often that i presume that it’s true in the case before me and that it is a presumptive authority because of the successive confirmations of many of its claims many of the members of the set according to that more reliable and higher authority that we’ve already talked about whoo so what most of you have been holding your breath for a long time
[37:46] you know philosophy ludwig wittgenstein said it’s like swimming underwater you know people who really do well at swimming underwater are the ones who can hold out. Hold your breath, make it to the end. Okay, you underwater swimmers, hold on now. They’re going to get to the end. What’s the point of all this? It’s simply that the errancy of Scripture, not inerrancy, but the errancy of Scripture has thoroughly adverse implications for the epistemic justification of our theological assertions. We have earlier observed that in answer to the question, how do you know that, How do you know that Jesus rose from the dead, that God is one, that Jesus is now the right hand of God interceding for the saints?
[38:26] How do you know these things? We’ve seen that evangelicals have answered such questions by warranting their theological assertions simply and sufficiently by pointing to their inclusion in the set of scriptural assertions. Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so. However, those who deny the inerrancy of Scripture render that justification pattern inadequate and imperfect. Isn’t that obvious?
[38:55] To affirm the errancy of the set of scriptural assertions means that P is not justified simply in virtue of its inclusion in the biblical set of propositions. Now, P may be true. P may be believed. But I want to know, is P known? And if it is known, it is not justified simply in virtue of the fact that that proposition is found in the Bible. Now, the consequences of this can be broadly indicated. Corresponding to what we have observed in the case of justifying that Sam’s phone number is 7915644. By the way, is that what I said earlier? Memory reliable?
[39:38] corresponding to what we have observed about justifying the Sam’s phone number is that by pointing to its inclusion in the set of remembered propositions from Ray’s book attempting to justify theological assertions by an errant set of propositions will eventually call for screening God’s word seeking a more sufficient authority outside of scripture and having a higher authority than God’s revealed word now while those who deny inerrancy may personally resist these things by an exercise of their will i mean they say oh i don’t want to be taken to that conclusion i mean they might exercise their will say no i don’t want to believe that they might resist those conclusions by an exercise of will they are epistemologically unavoidable with an errant bible it cannot be epistemologically sufficient to say, Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so, for the Bible teaches error as well as truth. The set of its assertions, just like Ray’s address book or even the Encyclopedia Britannica, is imperfect on this theory, and thus the inclusion of P in it is no guarantee of its truth. Something must be added to the picture. Something must be added to the justification pattern to render it a sufficient one. And the epistemological consequences of that, now that we are led down this path, are simply that we cannot know theological propositions on the evidence of sola scriptura. Protestant Reformation, of course, was founded on just that epistemological viewpoint. Scripture alone is the source of our theology. And secondly, we cannot know any theological propositions at all.
[41:25] I don’t mean we can’t believe them. I say we cannot know them. Now, Stephen Davis, a fellow who wrote the battle over the Bible that I spoke about earlier, the debate over the Bible, excuse me, he swallows this reductio ad absurdum that I presented to you tonight. He says, well, that’s where you want to leave me? Okay, that’s where it leads.
[41:47] He says, nobody knows biblical doctrines with certainty anyway, because you see, knowing things with certainty is available only in logic and mathematics. We do not have a sure guarantee of any doctrine, he says, and yet it’s still possible to know these doctrines in a weaker sense. He says, I can believe them with good reasons. I can have evidence for them without knowing that the Bible is inerrant. But you see, while that is true, it’s open to him to know certain things out of the Bible. He can only know them if he can judge each proposition in isolation by a higher authority. And the epistemological consequences of that are grave and significant. Somebody says, well, all right, I see your point. No more sola scriptura, no more knowledge of certain theological truths, but after all, no present Bible is inerrant anyway. I mean, the Bibles we have have come to us.
[42:44] Somebody had to make some kind of choice about canonical inclusion of books. There have been transmission errors. There’s a whole question of hermeneutics and how do we interpret the Bible. And so, what you leave us with, Dr. Bahnsen, is only conditional inerrancy anyway. What you leave us with is if he is taught in the Bible, then it’s true. You know, that’s right. If he is taught in the Bible, then it’s true is exactly the position I’m taking. Somebody says, But, we’re going to have to do some homework now. Is it taught in the Bible? Was it in the original manuscripts? Is it properly part of the canon of Scripture? Has it been interpreted correctly?
[43:24] When somebody argues that way, I have a tendency to say to them, did you think that inerrancy was a shortcut so that we didn’t have to do our homework? Inerrancy was never intended to short-circuit the idea of looking at the manuscripts of the Bible, interpreting them properly, understanding which books belong in the canon and which don’t. That isn’t the point of inerrancy. And so when somebody says, well, you end up only with conditional inerrancy, I’m saying, yes, but the conditions don’t hurt. They are the natural conditions of any intelligence commitment to the Word of God anyway.
[43:58] But just let me give you one example of how to handle those kinds of objections. I don’t have time to take them and give you a paradigm way of handling all such objections of this nature that we only have conditional inerrancy. I think there’s circulating at the present time a rather serious misunderstanding of the evangelical restriction of inerrancy, for instance, to the autographic text of the Bible. By autographic, I mean that text which was on the first manuscript written by Paul or whomever we might think of. Lester de Costa, for instance, claims that there are only two options. Either the Bible on our pulpits is the inspired word of God, or it is the uninspired word of man. He says, rely upon any part of it, God cannot even use it to communicate authoritatively to us.
[45:13] Now, from this mistaken starting point, the critic goes on to say of the evangelical restriction of inerrancy to the autographer due to errors in our present manuscripts and Bibles, that it entails that our Bibles today cannot be trusted at all, cannot communicate God’s Word to us, and cannot be the inspired Word of God. And if the present Bible with its errors is not inspired, then we are left with nothing since the autographer are lost. The argument here very simply is, look, your present Bible has errors in it anyway, so why all the fuss about an error?
[45:47] Now, such a dilemma rests on numerous fallacies and different understandings, however. In the first place, it confuses the Autographic Text of the Bible with an Autographic Codex of the Bible. These are words that will not be familiar to many of you. The text of the Bible will be the words that are written on the manuscripts. The codex will be the manuscript itself. Now notice, we are not restricting inerrancy to the Autographic Codex. That inerrancy only applies to those manuscripts. We are rather restricting inerrancy to the text that was on those original manuscripts. The loss of the manuscripts does not automatically entail the loss of the text.
[46:36] In fact, anybody who wants to do a little bit of reading on New Testament or Old Testament textual criticism, you will be amazed at the high degree of confirmation of the original text of the Bible that we have before us. Amazing. In fact, something of a pundit in Plato. I read Plato. That’s a little unusual these days, I think. And when you read Plato and want to do it seriously, you have to do some Greek textual criticism. And I’ll tell you what it’s like with Plato.
[47:09] Plato wrote at a particular point in history. And the first known manuscript of Plato’s writings, manuscript, the copy of his writings that we have, dates from seven centuries later. The Gospel of John was written sometime midway through to the end of the 1st century. And we have a small thread of a manuscript that contains a portion of the Gospel of John, which by all conservative and liberal estimates dates from about 95 to 105 AD. We’re talking about a 40-year gap, perhaps. Not a 7th century gap, and yet nobody in their right mind, nobody claimed we don’t know what Plato taught. Well, if that’s true, how much more can we be sure of the text of the New Testament? Now, I don’t say that we have it infallibly at every point, but I tell you that the fact we don’t have the manuscript does not, by any stretch of the imagination, imply that we don’t have the text. Certain manuscripts may have decayed or been lost, but the words of those manuscripts are still with us in good copies of the same.
[48:20] And let me add also that evangelicals do not, by their commitment to inerrancy, necessarily commit that logical fallacy of saying that if one point in a book is mistaken, then all the points in it are likewise mistaken. What I’m saying tonight is that if one point is mistaken, then every point is less than reliable. It may turn out to be true. It doesn’t have to be false. It says one thing’s false. The fact that Winston Churchill made one historical error in his book, The Gathering Storm, would not lead us to believe that everything in The Gathering Storm is wrong. But the fact that he made one mistake would convince us that he might have made a mistake elsewhere. Moreover, let’s remember that this predicate inerrant or inspired is not the kind of predicate that can be applied only in what might be called an all or nothing fashion. It’s just a false dilemma to say that a book either is totally inspired or totally uninspired, just as it’s fallacious to think that a book must be either completely true or completely false. There are predicates which are applied in degrees. You know, a man is not totally bald or totally not bald. Things are not totally warm or totally not warm.
[49:32] Totally fast or totally not fast. And inerrancy is a predicate like that. Inerrant and inspired can be applied in degrees. So let’s say we had an anthology of religious writings from various religions of the world i’d say that book is inerrant to the degree that it incorporates the judeo-christian scripture so you see inerrancy is not the kind of predicate that prevents us from saying that this bible on my pulpit is inerrant to the degree that it reflects the original text and that having been said then we don’t have any of these false dilemmas to worry about any longer now stephen davis tells us there’s no certainty available to men anyway on things that i don’t have time tonight to tell you why i think that is a bad epistemology that’s a good portion of my doctoral work who’s uh concerned advisory with the way to deal with that problem but i want you to know his own presumptive authority anyway davis says the bible’s not an error but there are ways in which we can see the truth of certain propositions in the Bible and therefore I can still think that it’s authoritative and that it’s true now his position therefore must be that some inspired scripture is in error or on the other hand that whatever is an error cannot be inspired on the first hand he might say God doesn’t really care about geographical details and historical accuracy and so there are some inspired scriptures which are an error on the other hand he might say well I do find some errors in the Bible and whatever I find to be an error can’t be inspired if all scripture is inspired however and this is going to be difficult he’s going to say there are some things in the Bible which are erroneous and therefore not inspired and yet he’s going to have to deal with the statement of Paul that all the scripture is inspired now let’s get down to the bottom line now, yeah, having set all this up. He wants a presumptive authority. The Bible has presumptive authority. I’m assuming that we wish non-arbitrarily to grant some form of epistemological superiority, Davis and myself. We don’t want to treat the Bible just like any other book of claims.
[51:56] It must be at least generally reliable so that each claim is not weighed in isolation on its own merits. There must be some presumptive truth about the Bible and its claims, even where they are not tested. And consequently, the Bible can be taken as a data control in my life. It can be considered an authority in my life, even in those areas where the evidence is only its own say-so.
[52:26] How does Stephen Davis know that Jesus is now at the right hand of God interceding for his saints? Well, I don’t know of any empirical, logical existential pragmatic or any other way to justify that proposition davis would undoubtedly say i know that because the bible teaches it and i say but you think the bible teaches error as well and he’d say yes but the bible has presumptive authority because i can test it in some areas okay not those areas dealing with metaphysics and theology per se but areas having to do with say the life Christ or the resurrection, miracles, matters such as those. I assume that we also want to grant that despite multiple authors and multiple books and multiple eras in which the books were written by these authors, that the reliability granted in one area of the Bible can be presumptively applied to other areas of the Bible as well. So that, unlike liberal and neo-orthodox theologians, evangelical believers, will range over the web of their beliefs, and they will treat the Bible, the Bible segment of their beliefs, as relatively firm and secure, controlled beliefs. Moreover, I’m assuming in my lecture tonight that the critic does wish to maintain that we can know, using that word know, we can know truths about our salvation and other theological doctrines, even though we don’t have an inerrant Bible.
[53:57] Well, having set all that up, then I ask, why give the Bible presumptive authority? Why should Davis even grant presumptive authority to the Bible? Why is it that he gives presumptive authority to what the Bible says in its untestable areas? Or why does he give it presumptive authority in those areas which can be tested, but have not yet been tested? Because how much of the Bible has Stephen Davis confirmed, after all, by his higher authority, whatever they may be. Well, Davis is going to say, I give presumptive authority to the Bible because God said these things. I believe the Bible to be inspired, to be the word of God. And God is in a position to know. God is always correct. What he says is true.
[54:43] But you see where the rub comes now? If God’s word is not always correct, then even a presumptive authority cannot be non-arbitrarily affirmed. I cannot give presumptive authority to the Bible until I confirm those theological areas. How do I know God is right when he says Jesus is at the right hand of God interceding for the saints? On what basis would I confirm even one proposition of that nature so that I might go on to say, well, if he’s been true in these propositions, very likely he’s true in further propositions.
[55:18] How does one non-arbitrarily decide where in the Bible God has actually spoken? Because Davis will say, well, if it’s false, God didn’t say it, because God doesn’t speak falsely. But how do you know where God has spoken? What is the sufficient criteria for making that determination? A negative test is not going to be enough. Somebody says, well, I know that God hasn’t spoken when I see that it’s false. But of course, a proposition may be false even though you haven’t proven it to be false, or found it to be false, yeah. So a negative test isn’t going to be enough.
[55:57] A presumptive authority granted to the Bible is just not reasonable given the Bible’s diverse segments, given the Bible’s diverse writers, the eras in which it is written, and given especially the supernatural areas in which the Bible declares certain truths. Since Davis cannot confirm even one such theological truth, he cannot tell us if the Bible is presumptively authoritative in the area of theology. Where is the evidence? What evidence is there for the isolated biblical claim that Christ intercedes for us?
[56:33] if somebody says it’s not enough simply to tell us that it’s in the Bible I want to maintain there’s no other available way to confirm that proposition and thus we’ve reached the point where without inerrancy we don’t even know in a non-arbitrary justified way we don’t even know our theological proposition about our salvation religious knowledge and certainty has in fact been destroyed now notice I didn’t say religious truth or religious beliefs, religious knowledge that’s been destroyed.
[57:08] If someone decides that they are going to screen God’s Word, then they’re going to render the Bible simply a source of hypotheses to be tested. I say, the Bible tells us, well, we’ve got to screen the Bible, though. Certain things in the Bible are true, certain things are false. Then what he tells me is the Bible only gives me a hypothesis, and then I must go from that point to confirm or infirm the hypothesis. Moreover, if somebody believes the Bible to make mistakes, you must seek a more sufficient authority outside of the Scripture. And that violates the whole idea of sola scriptura and allows no more than a presumptive authority for the Bible. And we’ve gone on to see in our lecture tonight that since you can’t confirm those propositions, apart from God’s say-so, you can’t even give a presumptive authority.
[57:57] And if someone says that the Bible makes mistakes and we have to have a higher authority than God’s Word, I want to maintain tonight that he in fact rejects the lordship of Jesus Christ. For in the end, he finally exalts evil over faith, and that unavoidably. And therefore, inerrancy can be denied only at the expense of sacrificing even the infallibility of Scripture’s theological statements. For none of them are sufficiently justified, and so none of them can be known. None can be given justification. We cannot justify these propositions by some other standard. How else would we know the person of Christ, the work of Christ, his intercession, or his return? We wouldn’t know these things depart from the Bible. So we cannot even justify, in terms of a presumptive authority, what the Bible says, because no induction and generalization is possible. Not even one theological assertion has been separately verified by the critics of inerrance.
[58:58] Well, I can give it to you then in a closing remark. The Bible’s claim that P is sufficient to guarantee its truth if you believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, because then Scripture is your final standard. But without that authority, there is no other sufficient warrant for believing that P, and as such, no other way of knowing that P. So that those who deny the inerrancy of Scripture are logically, even if not psychological, they are logically committed to walking the road of religious agnosticism and skepticism and walking it to its end. And I dare say the end of that road is clear. The end of that road is either a know-nothing religion, or we believe them. They might even be true, but we don’t know any.
[59:51] A know-nothing religion which cannot commend itself to 20th century thought, and I would add, ought not commit itself to 20th century thought, or it’s going to be, at the end of the road, no religion at all. Although people may psychologically resist that conclusion, the logical force of it will, I believe, in most cases, eat at them and eat at them and eat at them, until eventually they realize, if we can’t know anything in religion, we might as well give up religion altogether. And of course, any religion that is less will not be a biblical religion, because I began my lecture by saying there’s just too many statements in the Bible that we know this and we know that, and so a know-nothing religion is not biblical religion, and I dare say a know-nothing religion is in fact going to become no religion at all.
[60:43] Well, we’ve made some real big jumps at the end here, but you begin to see how important it is now. If you don’t hold to biblical inerrancy my own personal conviction, and I think it’s a defendable one, epistemologically, is that you end up with a know-nothing religion or no religion at all.
[61:00] One last caveat, and I think that the loss of knowledge and certainty about the Bible in fact leads to the loss of knowledge and certainty about any of you, because my whole career has been given to writing and defending the proposition that you don’t know that experiences is reliable, and that science is usable, and that logic is valid, unless you have a revelation from God that gives you a worldview in terms of which experience, science, logic make any sense. I can’t defend that tonight. I certainly wouldn’t try to do it in 60 seconds.
[61:40] But if I am right in that regard, and I certainly believe I am, since God’s revelation is a precondition to confidence concerning our sense experience, our induction, our memory, our science, our logic. Since the Bible is a precondition to these things, if we can’t know the Bible, then we can’t know logic and sense experience and memory. And if we can’t know those things, we can’t know anything. And so let me reformulate my conclusion. It isn’t just that if you deny the inerrancy of the Bible, you’re led down the road to a religious know-nothing-ism. It’s that you’re led down the road, ultimately, to knowing nothing at all. And I think at that point, the option thought of it fairly clear. I realize it’s an embarrassing and sometimes awkward footing to pretend the inerrancy of the Bible in the 20th century. But it certainly beats the alternative thank yes I do and I think that’s a very good question the question is doesn’t the Bible put some emphasis upon indeed something of a moral premium, a value on faith, not the idea of knowing for certain, walking by sight, for instance, but faith, which of course is another way of saying belief, and the answer is it certainly does.
[63:17] However, that isn’t the only thing the Bible talks about. We are to have faith, but it turns out that in terms of biblical teaching, those things about which we have faith, if they are taught in the Bible, are things which we also know, because according to the outlook of those who have the religious commitment of Scripture, God is the source of their information in those areas about which they have faith. And since God is the speaker, you couldn’t have a better justification for it.
[63:48] Consequently, biblical religion in one sense is I believe, the credo, I believe. And that emphasizes because of the faith nature of it that I’m bowing the head and submitting. God accused Fayette, it’s true. But on the other hand, the Bible equally stresses, as I read all those Bible verses to you at the beginning, that that amounts to knowledge. Because if God has said it, how could it possibly be wrong? So in answer, I’d say it’s equally true that the emphasis on faith is also an emphasis on knowledge in the Bible, depending on what perspective you approach in the same syndrome.
[64:21] Yes, the question here, and again, it is a thoughtful one. The question is, I mentioned earlier, actually Pinnock mentioned, that according to liberalism, when new findings come, then we modify what the Bible taught us. We let the Bible be corrected by modern scholarship. And that is a distinctive liberalism. Now, if I hold to inerrance rather than to a liberal approach, the question is, am I committed to saying that the Bible is true no matter what modern scholarship comes up with? I mean, am I really that kind of a throwback? Am I that obscure? That isn’t the attitude of the questioner. But I mean, it leads to this. I mean, are we really saying we’re going to hold to the Bible even when there’s clear and sufficient evidence against it? Yeah.
[65:06] And the reason for that is because the only evidence that can be brought against the Word of God would be apparent evidence against the Word of God. Yeah, I would believe that scientific evidence or historical evidence, contrary to the teaching of the Bible, can be harmonized with the Bible when one studied science and history long enough and understands and popularly. I’m especially concerned about scientific claims. There’s an arrogance about 20th century science, which is totally beyond anything which even unbelievers think is deserved.
[65:37] And let me give you an example from history. It used to be earlier in the century how people would ridicule the Bible for mentioning the Hittites, the Old Testament. Well, of course, we know more about the Hittites now than virtually any other ancient Near Eastern group because of archaeological finds.
[65:53] And so often it’s the case that we walk by faith and not by sight because I say, if God said it, it’s true. And what I have to do is I have to study the Bible further to make sure I haven’t misinterpreted it, and that’s the source of the conflict. Or I have to study my science and history further to find out what other facts have to be taken into account. But in a sense, that is the heart of religious commitment, to say, I believe it because God said it. And when the opposition is there, I continue to believe it. That, you see, that’s true existentialism, not irrational existentialism. That’s the true existentialism of Abraham, who said, God told me to do it, I know it’s true. Even if Isaac has to be raised from the dead, God said it is to be done.
[66:36] One word. At the end of my lecture, the reason that I said I have one quote and caveat, that’s precisely the reason I put that in there, because I recognize that in a sense, my lecture has been an inner house lecture up until the very end. What I’m saying is anybody who wants to take a religious approach to life is going to have to have a religious authority. And it’s impossible to have that religious authority in the areas of metaphysics or theology unless you have an authority who doesn’t err. For when God says to me certain things which are beyond my visibility, beyond my logical prowess and so forth, I have to take them on His say-so. And if I can’t know things on God’s say-so, I might believe them. But if I can’t know them on His say-so, I’m committed to agnosticism.
[67:24] But at the very end, what I added is, Now, lest anybody walk out of here and say, yeah, well, those Christians, they’ve got that problem, but we don’t. What I wanted to say is, can’t be proven in one minute, but I also think that unbelievers have to have epistemological authorities also. They rely on their sensation or their memory or their logic or pragmatic tests or whatever it is. But in the end, one has to ask, can those justification patterns be accepted? Are they reliable? And if not, then we have to ask, well, what worldview will make them usable? It’s my conviction, we’ll take time later if you want another lecture at another time, that it’s my conviction that you can’t use logic, science, memory, and all the rest unless you have a biblical worldview.
[68:12] Consequently, if we Christians have this problem, that we can’t know anything unless the Bible’s an error, then I want to expand this further and say, you unbelievers, You non-Christians in the audience tonight, you have an even further problem because since we can’t supply you with a religious worldview in terms of which logic and science can be used, you don’t know anything at all. And that’s an apologetical challenge. That’s not something that’s proven tonight. But for that reason, I had this relevance and these remarks for everybody.
[68:41] This recording was brought to you by the Bahnsen Bible Academy. an educational website dedicated to helping Christians understand and apply the Bible through the teaching ministry of Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen. Duplication, sharing, and distribution of this lecture are encouraged. This is the Bahnsen Bible Academy. Preserve teaching for serious study.
Continue Studying: Who Has the Final Authority?
The question of Sola Scriptura reaches beyond a historical dispute between Protestants and Rome. It confronts the foundation of every claim to truth: Who has the final authority to determine what we should believe?
In our foundational article, Final Authority: Why Scripture Has the Last Word, we examine the competing claims of human tradition and divine revelation, and why every worldview must ultimately answer the question of ultimate authority.
Continue reading: Final Authority: Why Scripture Has the Last Word