[00:00.000] If you had understood all the stuff that had gone before, the kinds of explanations of transcendental argumentation and the place of that kind of argumentation or program in the history of epistemology and that sort of thing, if you knew all those qualifications and characteristics that make it unique when it comes to presuppositional argumentation that we talked about this morning, and I dare say you could have read the following nine or ten pages in Van Til’s writings and that would have been enough right there. I mean, in a sense, you want to boil Van Til down just to the bare bones of the apologetic argument, the structure itself, here it is. The survey of Christian epistemology, I begin on page 201. In this respect, the process of knowledge is a growth into the truth. For this reason, we have spoken of the Christian theistic method as the method of implication into the truth of God.
[00:58.480] Reasoning in a spiral fashion rather than in a linear fashion. Accordingly, we have said that we can use the old terms deduction and induction if only we remember that they must be thought of as elements in this one process of implication into the truth of God. Think of it as spiraling down, implicating yourself deeper and deeper into the truth of God using deductive and inductive reasoning as you go. If we begin the course of spiral reasoning at any point in the finite universe, as we must because that is the proximate starting point of all reasoning, we can call the method of implication into the truth of God a transcendental method. That is, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us.
That is, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge
in order that it may be intelligible to us.
[01:58.480] That sentence is a crucial one. You want to get that. We must seek to determine, this is transcendental method, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us. It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions. It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any object of knowledge, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the transcendental method seeks to recognize.
[02:40.840] So the transcendental method is trying to exhibit something, and that is, if what you’re talking about is significant, you must immediately have God as part of your worldview, or you must immediately acknowledge, incorporate the Christian worldview. It does not reason deductively and inductively from outside the Christian worldview to the Christian worldview. It rather says all of your deductive and inductive reasoning already presupposes the Christian worldview if you claim that it has validity, meaning, or significance.
[03:13.440] The charges made against this type of reasoning, we must turn upon those who made them. It will be said of this type of reasoning that it introduces the subjective element of belief in God. Belief in God, which all men do not share. Of this, we can only say that all men should share that belief, and before the fall of man into sin, man did have that belief. Belief in God is the most human attitude conceivable. It is abnormal not to believe in God. We must therefore hold that only the Christian theist has real objectivity, while the others are introducing false prejudices or subjectivity.
[03:52.860] This is nuclear. This is nuclear strength, this paragraph. Van Til says, in order for your argument to have significance, you must incorporate belief in God. The comeback is, oh, well, then you’re saying that coherence, logical validity, the significance of arguments depends upon a subjective element, whether you believe in God or not. Van Til says, I must turn this back, this criticism back on the person making the criticism. He says, you’re the one who’s introducing subjectivity. Sound familiar? He said, all these other methods of argument reduce to subjectivity and skepticism. He says, because of the way you approach matters, you’re the one who makes everybody subjective. I’m the only one that is introducing objectivity because it’s the God’s eye point of view that can make sense out of, give intelligibility to the way that you’re reasoning.
[04:47.300] The charge is made that we engage in circular reasoning. Now, if it be called circular reasoning when we hold it necessary to presuppose the existence of God, we are not ashamed of it because we are firmly convinced that all forms of reasoning that leave God out of account will end in ruin. Okay, so the criticism is made, you’re engaged in circular reasoning. Van Til says, there’s two ways you can respond to that. One, if you remember that anybody who doesn’t reason the way we are ends in ruin, then I don’t care what you call it. Call it circular reasoning, big deal. The point is, my circular reasoning saves intelligibility, and your whatever you want to call it reasoning, deductive, inductive, linear reasoning, destroys the intelligibility of thinking.
[05:34.780] Yet, we hold that our reasoning cannot fairly be called circular reasoning because we are not reasoning about and seeking to explain facts by assuming the existence and meaning of certain other facts on the same level of being with the facts we are investigating, and then explaining these facts, in turn, by the facts with which we began. We are presupposing God, not merely another fact of the universe. Let me paraphrase. Van Til says, if we’re arguing about some creaturely element of thought or experience, and we tried to introduce something else on the same level, and the two were paying each other’s debts in the argument, yeah, then we’d be reasoning in a circuit. He says, we’re not reasoning about another fact of the universe. We’re not, to put it in his terminology, we’re not reasoning about something that’s within the framework of our presuppositions. Within the framework, you can’t reason in a circle. Somebody wants to say, I believe that the price of eggs is $1.59, and then his argument includes as a premise the price of eggs is $1.59, Van Til would say, yeah, that’s circular reasoning.
[06:47.700] That’s fallacious. But we’re not arguing about another fact of the universe. We’re arguing about God. We’re not arguing on the same level with the facts of the universe. We’re arguing about something which is the framework, I don’t mean that in a pantheistic sense, I mean that epistemologically. God is the framework that makes intelligible all the other reasoning that you engage in. And about that kind of thing, all you can do is reason in a circle. Randy earlier brought up the illustration, and I remind you again, when people argue about logic, they’ve got to assume logic. Well, they argue about it. So circular reasoning, no. Spiral reasoning. Because we are assuming something on a different level, now we’ll call this the transcendental level, different level from that which we deal with when we talk about the facts of history or, you know, science or anything else that human beings reason about.
[07:45.840] God has a special status. God is the transcendental. God’s not just one more object among many. I assure you that when in secular universities, professors, philosophy professors talk about proving God’s existence, they always take for granted. They don’t flag it, they don’t let you know they’re doing this, they may not even think about how they’re doing it because they take it for granted. They always assume that proving God is like proving any other fact of the universe. You’ve got to use the same kind of logic, the same kind of empirical premises, and so forth. And then we hope that we can get a generalization. If you’re religious, you hope that you can get a generalization, big enough or extensive enough to finally get to the supernatural. Of course you never can.
[08:36.360] Yes, that’s right, refuses to begin with the creator creature distinction. God is not like another fact of the universe. Somebody says oh well how so god exists we exist so he’s just like anything else that exists we say no god exists in such a way that nothing else could exist without him that gives him kind of it’s not just a special prerogative it’s like well we give special favors to god like we do to our grandfather you know we don’t make our grandfather carry his weight when we’re bringing groceries in from the store because you know we know that he’s old and decrepit or something we’re not saying we want to grant god special favors we’re saying god has special prerogative everything depends upon god and therefore we don’t reason about god in the same way that we reason about the other facts of the universe.
[09:17.900] Now go to page 204, let me back up and get a running start into what I wanted to read from page 203 at the very bottom of the page. If god is to be thought of at all as necessary for man’s interpretation of the facts or objects of knowledge he must be thought of as being determinative of the objects of knowledge in other words he must then be thought of as the only ultimate interpreter and man must be thought of as a finite re-interpreter if god and his existence is significant for the objects of knowledge it must be because he’s determined the objects of knowledge if he determines the objects of knowledge then he’s the ultimate interpreter and we’re thinking his thoughts after him when we know things we’re re-interpreting since then the absolute self-consciousness of god is the final interpreter of all facts man’s knowledge is analogical of god’s knowledge since all the finite facts exist by verge view of the interpretation of god man’s interpretation of the finite facts is ultimately dependent upon god’s interpretation of the facts man cannot except to his own hurt look at the facts without looking at god’s interpretation of the facts man’s knowledge of the facts is then a re-interpretation of god’s interpretation it is this that is meant by saying that man’s knowledge is analogical of god’s knowledge we must now consider more fully the question how one who has thus become convinced that analogical reasoning is the only type of reasoning that gives us truth at all must face one who is convinced that univocal reasoning, where the creator-creature distinction is not taken into account, is the only type of reasoning that can possibly bring one into contact with the truth. I’m going to jump down now to the last sentence in the middle paragraph. We can start with any fact at all and challenge our friends of the enemy to give us an intelligible interpretation of it.
[11:20.000] Start with any fact and say, just give me an interpretation that’s intelligible, that gives me a broader context and then a context beyond that one where everything fits, so it’s all coherent, so it makes sense.
[11:35.240] Now what happens, you see, is that when you push out far enough, the unbeliever says, well, everything that happens is random. You say, oh, it is? Well, then if it’s random, then you couldn’t be very sure about these mechanical principles of fixing carburetors that you were using when you talked about this car. Because in a random universe, there are no mechanical principles you can count on. But you don’t get there immediately.
[11:57.140] You’ve got to say, give me an interpretation. Now, make that intelligible. Put that into a broader context. Since the non-theist is so heartily convinced that univocal reasoning is the only possible kind of reasoning, we must ask him to reason univocally for us in order that we may see the consequences. Underline that. See the consequences. Van Til is going to argue, for argument’s sake, assume what you’re saying is true. What are the consequences of it? And if those consequences are absurdity or the impossibility of the very thing you started with, then you’ve refuted yourself. Univocal. Oh, univocal. Univocal. Okay.
[12:38.760] Univocal means to speak with one voice or to have everything have the same value. It’s a basic kind of meaning. Univocal definition of terms. Okay. No, univocal, Van Til is using kind of in a metaphorical way to indicate that God and man, when we talk about God reasoning and man reasoning, we’re speaking univocally. They reason the same way. They’re on the same level. There’s no difference between them as they approach the facts and try to figure out the universe. You said a while ago that it’s to ignore and create a creature. That’s right. God and man on the same level, so there’s no creator-creature distinction.
[13:17.480] Analogical reasoning says God first interprets things, so my thinking is not original and it’s not thinking that God does. I’m not God. I have to think his thoughts after him. So that’s analogical. The unbeliever wanting to have autonomy says no, God and man approach everything in the same way. God may be bigger, he may be stronger, but in terms of epistemology, God knows in the same way that man knows. He approaches information and tries, and tries to interpret it.
[13:47.420] So, we invite the autonomous man to reason, to interpret something, and then try to show him the consequences of it. In other words, we believe it to be in harmony with, and a part of the process of reasoning analogically with the non-theist, that we ask him to show us first what he can do. We may, to be sure, offer to him at once a positive statement of our position, but this he will at once reject is quite out of the question. So we may ask him to give us something better.
[14:14.060] I actually love it when Van Til starts playing, you know, like he’s just very simple and coy. He goes, well, here’s my position, here’s how I understand the facts and everything. Then he goes, oh, we can’t accept that. And he goes, oh, okay. Well then, give me something better, please. The reason he gives for rejecting our position is in the last analysis, that it involves self-contradiction.
[14:34.060]
We see again, as an illustration of this charge, the rejection of the theistic conception of God, conception that God is absolute, and that he has nevertheless, created this world for his glory. This, the non-theist says, is self-contradictory. And it no doubt is, from a non-theistic point of view. How can God be all glorious and then create the world to bring him glory? He already has all the glory, so how can he create the world to do that? But the final question is not whether a statement appears to be contradictory. The final question, everybody ready for the bell to ring? The final question is in which framework, or on which view of reality, the Christian or the non-Christian, the law of contradiction can have application to any fact. Here we’re arguing about logic, the law of non-contradiction. Van Til says in the end, it’s not important what appears contradictory to you or to me. Ultimately, the question is, within which framework can logic have any meaning at all?
The non-Christian rejects the Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the idea of contingency. Those of you who’ve heard my argument with Gordon Stein, see where I got my stuff, right? When Stein now has to give a foundation for logic, all he has left is contingency, because that’s his worldview. But guess what? If it’s a contingent universe, there are no necessary laws of thinking. What we shall have to do then is try to reduce our opponent’s position to an absurdity. Nothing less will do. Without God, man is completely lost in every respect, epistemologically, as well as morally and religiously.
Van Til’s, this is something that really grabbed hold of me a number of years ago, is I realized Van Til, when he talks about salvation, he’s not just talking about going to heaven. He’s saying you can’t save morality, life in this world, you can’t save your thinking, the intelligibility of your thinking, if you’re not a Christian. But exactly what do we mean by reducing our opponent’s position to an absurdity? He thinks he has already reduced our position to an absurdity by the simple expedient just spoken of. But we must point out to him that upon a theistic basis, our position is not reduced to an absurdity by indicating the logical difficulties involved in the conception of creation. Upon the theistic basis, it must be contended that the human categories are but analogical of God’s categories, so that it is to be expected the human thought will not be able to comprehend how God shall be absolute and at the same time create the universe for his glory.
If taken on the same level of existence, it is no doubt a self-contradiction to say that a thing is full and at the same time is being filled. But it is exactly this point that is in question, whether God is to be thought of, as on the same level with man.
[17:42.460]
What the anti-theists should have done is to show that even upon a theistic basis, our conception of creation involves self-contradiction. Van Til says, if you want to do damage to my position, come stand within my worldview and feel that it is incoherent. I welcome you. That would be a worthwhile intellectual, you know, project for an unbeliever. But for you to stand in your worldview and say what we are, our theological premises are inconsistent, why should I be concerned about that? Of course they’re inconsistent in your worldview. Paraphrase, take on the same level of existence and that of self-contradiction. On the same level.
We’re not dealing with God as just any other truth or premise or reality that we know in our natural experience. God is a supernatural being and God’s significance in epistemology is that he has transcendental importance not just, I mean, of all the things that I know on the creaturely level, some are more important than others. Okay? From a personal standpoint, I’d say knowing my children is more important than knowing Oral Hirshhiser. Okay? So they’re all on the same level as human beings. Some are more important to me than others. And of all the things that I know, some are more epistemologically important. Okay?
Probably a good thing for me to know, you know, generally, how, well, how can I do this? What example do I want to use? It’s more significant for me to know something about combustion engines than it is for me to know, for instance, that my car is out of gas at this particular moment. More important in than the knowledge of combustion engines is more general and systematic and therefore has more application and implication than does the simple fact that my car right now is out of gas.
So we have, on the level of our natural experience, things that we know, some are more important than others, but they’re all on the same level. How important is the knowledge of God? It’s more important than combustion engines and more important than my children, as important as those things are because God’s existence or the truth of the statement that God exists has implications for everything that I know. So when I argue about God, I’m not arguing on the same level as just anything else that I might know. It’s not just one more object. It’s not like, well, every proposition that’s true has the same value.
[20:17.460 → 20:19.460]
Well, as truth, abstractly put, yeah, they’re all called truth, so they all have the same value, but there’s more to propositions than just their truth value. Likewise, the proposition about God’s existence is not even in the same category as those truths about our natural experience because that truth is a transcendental, in terms of which everything else makes sense. So at different levels. That’s a paraphrase. Actually, his is a paraphrase of my technical explanation, but that’s what he’s getting at. Can you explain why it’s convenient that God is full of glory and yet created to fear the Lord? Am I reading that wrong? I thought he was using that… He says, if you think that God is like any other natural object, and the way we know God is the way we know everything else in the world, then it will seem like a contradiction to say that he’s full of glory, yet he’s being filled with glory. But if God is not like every other object, within Christian theology, we can believe that God manifests the fullness of his glory by bringing greater glory to himself through saving people, creating the world, showing the wonder of the stars, and so forth.
Dr. Bahnsen. Yes, sir? Is it fair to say that an example of contingency would be when we had a debate with Stein, where he denied the immaterial realm while holding the laws of logic. Then when you asked him what the laws of logic were, he ended up saying that they were abstract or immaterial. Yeah, well, he wanted them… He was contradicting himself. Stein was so bad in that debate that he didn’t even stick to one position when he was arguing with me. And so that’s always, you know, the danger to get somebody who’s slippery, and he doesn’t even know that he’s slipping back and forth. At one point, Stein said that the laws of logic are conventional. Conventional. Yeah, which would mean contingent, depending on the culture in which you live. At another point, he talked about the laws of logic having necessity. And so, you know, sometimes you got to get the guy to stand still so you can shoot him. You know, it’s like, which position do you want to hold here? I’ll be glad to shoot you at any point, but stand still.
Okay, page 205 in the middle. We must therefore give our opponents better treatment than they give us. We must point out to them that univocal reasoning, autonomous reasoning, itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. This is crucial. Van Til says, the unbeliever sees contradictions in Christian theology. We say, well, yeah, within your framework of thought, they are contradictory. They appear so.
We must point out to them that univocal reasoning, autonomous reasoning, itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well
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But they’re not contradictory within our worldview. He says, but now we must do better to the unbeliever than he’s done to us. We don’t want to simply say, you know, your view of reality, say your view of evolution is contradictory because we know God created everything in a mature way according to the Bible. So that’s contradictory. He says, we got to do better than that. We want to show that their point of view is contradictory even on their understanding of logic. Take your own worldview, and Van Til says, you destroy yourself. What did David Hume say yesterday in that quotation? Oh, I took it upstairs. That if we make reason abstract, it provides the grounds for what? Do you have it there, Scott? Can you give it to me exactly? …Against itself. So we take what you understand as logic and feel that you’re being self-contradictory on your own terms. … He was specifically thinking of reason in the empiricist way, but the point generally taken is what you take to be reason destroys itself.
It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions. It is this too that we should mean when we say that we are arguing ad hominem. We do not really argue ad hominem unless we feel that someone’s position involves self-contradiction, and there is no self-contradiction unless one’s reasoning is shown to be directly contradictory of or to lead to conclusions which are contradictory of one’s own assumptions. That’s 205.
To argue ad hominem here, I don’t think he should have put it this way, but basically he’s arguing against the man by saying, I’ll grant whatever you want, and then I’ll argue against what we’ve already granted based on what you’ve given me. He picked that up by Kant, by the way. Kant called that argument ad hominem as well. Oh, okay, that’s good. Kant apparently used that kind of terminology. In terms of the way logic is taught today, that’s not usually the understanding of an ad hominem argument, but you can see how that’s against the man. You accept what the man says, and then you turn it against him.
On page 206, the sentence at the end of the paragraph spanning the page. Similarly, if we reason when we place ourselves upon our opponent’s position, we cannot for a moment do more than argue thus for argument’s sake. Van Til says, I’m going to meet this man on his own turf for argument’s sake. Sometimes people have asked me, Dr. Bahnsen, why did you bother to go study philosophy at a secular university? Why did you get your PhD with people who don’t share your Christian worldview? Well, I mean, there are other kinds of answers.
[26:03.460] I mean, I think I learned a lot about philosophy and technical sense and so forth and so on. But you see, if I’m going to do apologetics, well, these philosophers didn’t help me learn about Christianity and how to defend it. They taught me a lot about how unbelievers reason. So I am now able to meet them. I mean, I hope I can meet them on their own turf and play their game better than they play it. Okay.
[26:26.460] So when I take a course, it’s from John Hospers, who is, in ethical theory, what’s known as a rule egoist. That is, we should follow those rules that are in our personal benefit. That’s his ethical theory. I can, without having to go to the Bible and say, shame on you, Dr. Hospers, you’re disagreeing with what Jesus said. I can take what Hospers taught me and write a paper showing that rule egoism destroys itself. So that’s why you learn something about the way unbelievers reason. Now, you don’t all have to go and get a PhD in philosophy. That’s not the point of the illustration. I’m trying to illustrate what Van Til means, that we place ourselves on our opponent’s position for argument’s sake.
[27:11.460] When we reason thus, we are not reasoning on the basis of some abstract law of self-contradiction. We’ve seen that the very question between the theist and the anti-theist is as to the foundation of the law of contradiction. When they criticize our position, and think they’ve reduced it to the place where it falls under the law of self-contradiction, we do not give in to defeat or appeal to irrationality in the name of faith. But we challenge their interpretation of the law of contradiction. We hold that they have falsely assumed that the self-contradictory is to be identified with that which is beyond the comprehension of man. But this takes for granted that human categories are ultimate categories, which is just the thing in question.
[28:00.460] The unbeliever assumes his categories must be the ultimate ones. We say, well, that’s what you’re supposed to be proving. And then toward, it’s about three quarters down the page, 206, yet in order to bring this argument as closely to the non-regenerate consciousness as we may, we must seek to show that the non-theist is self-contradictory upon his own assumptions as well as upon the assumption of the truth of theism. And that he cannot even be self-contradictory upon a non-theistic basis, since if he saw himself to be self-contradictory, he would be self-contradictory no longer.
[28:37.460] Now, when this method of reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary is carried out, there is really nothing more to do. I mean, he has more to say. But do you get the point? Essentially, I’m saying to the unbeliever, you want to argue with me? Want to come onto the basketball court and play the reason-giving game? Great. Then let’s look at your worldview, look at my worldview. On your worldview, even given your assumptions, you can’t give reasons. You’re defeated on your own terms. By the way, you’re also defeated from the authoritative standpoint that I might have as a Christian, saying God says that you’re wrong. But you too have to say that you’re wrong, given your own assumptions.
[29:15.460] But if you stand in my worldview, I can save rationality, science, whatever you’ve been arguing. And Van Til says, once we’ve done that, there’s really nothing else to do. I mean, when somebody brings up a particular objection, there’s research you might want to do about that to help them, you know, feel more comfortable about the truth of Christianity. But from an apologetical standpoint, what he’s essentially done is taken the weapon away from the unbeliever, saying, you want to argue with us? You haven’t got any weapons. Because your method of arguing undermines arguing. And so you can’t play this game. Like what he said about complete self-contradiction is impossible, only in hell. Well, even there it’s not. It would be hell if it was complete. But in hell, men will still be made in the image of God.
Okay, so that’s my first short reading in this filet mignon, back to the basics of transcendental presuppositional apologetics. The other one comes from the defense of the faith. Somebody who has the formula can figure out the pages. That’d be wonderful. I’m going to be on pages 116 to 120, and then page 135. For pages 116 to 120, subtract 17 according to our formula. So if I’m on 116, you’re on 99? Okay.
Reasoning by presupposition. Did it work? Oh, I love it when a thing comes together like this. These things being as they are, it will be our first task in this faculty field that a consistently Christian method of apologetic argument, in agreement with its own basic conception of the starting point, must be by presupposition. To argue by presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s method. That’s a very important sentence. To reason by presupposition, you’ve got to lay out your metaphysics and epistemology, and you’ve got to make sure that the unbeliever understands his metaphysics and epistemology.
To argue by presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s method
The reformed apologist will frankly admit that his own methodology presupposes the truth of Christian theism. Basic to all the doctrines of Christian theism is that of the self-contained God, or, if we wish, that of the ontological trinity. It is this notion of the ontological trinity that ultimately controls a truly Christian methodology. Our metaphysical view controls our method, our epistemology. Based upon this notion of the ontological trinity and consistent with it, is the concept of the council of God according to which all things in the created world are regulated. So we begin with God, the triune, God who is self-sufficient, God the creator, God the sovereign controller of all things.
[32:10.460] Christian methodology is therefore based upon presuppositions that are quite the opposite of those of the non-Christian. It is claimed to be of the very essence of any non-Christian form of methodology that it cannot be determined in advance to what conclusions it must lead. It’s neutral. We just go out there and let the facts speak for themselves, right? To assert as the Christian apologist is bound to do, if he is not to deny the very thing he is seeking to establish, that the conclusion of a true method is the truth of Christian theism is from the point of view of the non-Christian the clearest evidence of authoritarianism. In spite of this claim to neutrality on the part of the non-Christian, the reformed apologist must point out that every method, the supposedly neutral one, no less than any other, presupposes either the truth or falsity of Christian theism.
You might want to make a mental note or in your actual written notes here, Van Til is offering now a bivalent structure for argument. He says, every method assumes the truth of Christian theism or that it’s not true. … Ultimately, there’s only two. Why am I pointing this out? Might as well cash in on it now. Because people are always going to say, well, Van Til, you’ve only refuted worldviews 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. What about worldviews 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10? Van Til’s point is there’s only two worldviews. Or to put it better, every worldview either assumes the truth of Christianity or assumes that it’s not true. The objection immediately is, no, it doesn’t. There are some that are neutral, that are noncommittal. Now, who’s right, who’s wrong here? Van Til is going to quote Jesus, right? He who is not with me is against me. That’s the interesting thing about this worldview. You don’t get to sit on the fence about it. You either affirm it or you deny it. Now, you may be polite in your denying it. You might even say, I’m glad to talk about this. It might possibly be true. But to say it might possibly be true is from Van Til’s standpoint to say it’s not actually true and so you’re denying it.
Given this, now, if he’s wrong about this, you might have to do some reconstruction of the presuppositional approach. But you have to understand Van Til doesn’t believe we’ve got a zillion worldviews out there. Let’s get busy because by the time we die, we’ve got to refute each one of them. It’s not an inductive process of knocking down this one, then this one, then this one, then this one. Van Til says all of them either assume Christianity is true or it’s not. Now, if they assume that it’s true, we’re done.
[34:53.460] Obviously. But the point is, the reason we’re arguing is because they assume Christianity is not true. So they’re in that worldview that denies Christianity. I feel like …, right? Yes. Instead of worldviews, propositions. Yeah, this is… If it’s true or false, do the worldviews against Christianity or support Christianity? This is Van Til’s Law of Excluded Middle. On worldviews, it’s either Christian or it’s not Christian. Somebody says, yeah, but look at all the differences between existentialists and rationalists, you know, and nihilists and on and on and on. All these different worldviews that are out there. Van Til says, ah, they’re all brothers under the skin. For our purposes, they really all have the same worldview and then they argue over details.
Now, that makes sense by analogy. There are a lot of Christians, right? We’re all brothers under the skin, spiritually speaking, but then we differ on details. Some of us believe in infant baptism, some of us don’t. And that isn’t to say it’s relative and the Bible’s not clear on it, but we’re all Christians in terms of our worldview. And so, there are non-Christians who disagree with each other on details, but the point is, you’re either Christian or you’re not Christian when it comes to your worldview. Every method, even the supposedly neutral one, presupposes either the truth or the falsity of Christian theism. He excludes any middle ground. The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect rather than direct. There’s only two values, Christianity or not Christianity. Now, I’m going to use an indirect method. I’m going to refute non-Christianity. If you know anything about logic, okay, it’s like a disjunctive syllogism, you know? A or B, not B, therefore, A.
[36:45.460] The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect rather than direct. The issue between believers and non-believers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to facts or laws whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties through the debate. And here is the crucial sentence. The question is rather as to what is the final reference point required to make the facts and laws intelligible. We can’t directly go to the facts and say that proves Christianity and nor can the unbeliever go directly to the facts and say that disproves Christianity. Van Til says the question is rather whose reference point can make the facts or the laws intelligible. The question is as to what the facts and laws really are. Are they what the non-Christian methodology assumes that they are? It doesn’t mean here what are the specific facts of history but what is a fact? What’s the nature of a fact? Is it a random event in a chance universe? Are they what the non-Christian methodology assumes that they are? Are they what the Christian theistic methodology presupposes they are? When people say let’s just go to the facts to settle this we have to say well, but what do you think a fact is? What do I think a fact is? If a fact is just some kind of random event in a chance universe then we can’t go to the facts to settle anything.
[38:17.460] Facts don’t settle anything because they’re random. It’s a chance universe. So when you say let’s go to the facts to settle something you must be thinking of facts as the Christian thinks of facts in order that you can use them to argue against the Christian view. It’s not just they have no stability they have no It’s not that you assume they have stability he’s assuming they have a stability but he’s assuming that they have identifiability as well that they’re individuated from one another. The answer to this question cannot be finally settled by any direct discussion of facts. It must in the last analysis be settled indirectly. The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument’s sake in order to show him that on such a position the facts are not facts and the laws are not laws. I say okay you’ve got your world view let me reason with you in terms of your world view. I’m going to stand within your framework of thought and guess what within that framework of thought there are no laws there are no facts. Why are there no laws? Just so we don’t run over this too quickly. Well in a chance universe there can’t be any necessity to anything.
[39:38.460] In a chance universe things can change so there’s no invariance. In a chance universe there couldn’t be anything necessary and invariant so there couldn’t be anything law-like. How come there are no facts? In a chance universe you can’t individuate one thing from another. Everything is sound and fury signifying nothing. Everything is random. Everything is the same and everything is different. Everything is so different that you never can say there’s a similarity between two things. You couldn’t even identify that is a barn over there because that assumes that there’s some continuous idea of barness but in a chance universe there’s just experience experience experience experience and you can’t give any kind of unity to it. So there are no facts and there are no laws. … In a chance universe when I say there’s experience experience experience what have I done? Minimally, I’ve said there’s one two three things. … That’s right. I’ve individuated them. In a chance universe for all I know there’s not three experiences there’s just one experience. And it has what we call three as components. But you can’t call them components because that assumes there’s an order in terms of which you can see a structure.
[41:00.460] When you get hold of this argument you see how powerful it is? But we can utterly destroy the unbeliever. Take his worldview and just say on your worldview you couldn’t argue at all. Over and over again this paragraph right here in the middle of 100 reference point you know without that you know you can’t make assumptions or any facts. Sartre over you know he’s famous for saying you know without the finite reference point infinite reference point all the finite references point … and he’s trying to be consistent with that. Oh yes. Yeah Sartre is good that way. He admits all these other schools of philosophy are a bunch of lawyers basically. They’re just you know they’re paid to try to come up with answers they’re trying to defend a guilty client and you know no one’s going to be able to do it.
[42:06.460] Everything’s absurd. Sartre said. That’s my beginning point. Everything’s absurd. Now what are we going to do? Since everything’s absurd and I don’t believe Sartre can live fully consistently, because in the end, to give you one example, Sartre says, in an absurd universe, no one has authority over you, so no one can tell you how to live your life. You be authentic, you be free. So Sartre says, I order you to take no orders from anybody.
[42:23.840] Okay, continuing the reading. We must also ask the non Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument’s sake, in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do facts and laws appear intelligible. Now, if you stand within the framework of Christian presuppositions, not only do you see that facts and laws are intelligible. But within this framework, it’s the only one where they could be intelligible. This, too, is anticipating an argument that many people bring up. They’ll say, well, you presuppositionalists have shown a sufficient condition for intelligibility, but you haven’t shown that it’s necessary. Van Til answers it here. He says, well, within our framework, it’s necessary. Somebody says, okay, but maybe your framework’s not the right one. Van Til says, fine, what’s the alternative? Absurdity. But that’s fine. Your choices are between, Christianity and absurdity. But don’t suggest that within the Christian framework, which makes sense of things, you can continue arguing, and then argue there might be another framework that can do it just as well. Within the Christian framework, there’s one and only one that can do it. Now, you might make that the basis for rejecting Christianity. So, well, I don’t think you’ve really shown that. I don’t think you can show that. Van Til would say, fine. Then where are you standing when you’re making this criticism of my worldview? You’re standing in my worldview in another one. I’d like you to tell me about that worldview. Of course, we’ve already done this dance, right? And it doesn’t work.
[43:59.560] To admit one’s own presuppositions and to point out the presuppositions of others is therefore to maintain that all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. He means your reasoning about your ultimate presuppositions. The starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another. Let us say that the Christian apologist has placed the position of Christian theism before his opponent. Let us say further. That he has pointed out that his own method of investigation of reality presupposes the truth of his position. This will appear to his friend, whom he is seeking to win to an acceptance of the Christian position, as highly authoritarian and out of accord with the proper use of human reason.
[44:39.160] What will the apologist do next? If he is a Roman Catholic or an Arminian, he will tone down the nature of Christianity to some extent in order to make it appear that the consistent application of his friend’s neutral method will lead to an acceptance of Christian theism after all. That is, we don’t want to seem authoritarian, so we’ll accept what you call a neutral method and try to satisfy you that your neutral, allegedly neutral, method, your pretended neutral method, will actually lead to Christianity. But if he’s a Calvinist, this way is not open to him. He will point out that the more consistently his friend applies his supposedly neutral method, the more certainly he will come to the conclusion that Christian theism is not true.
[45:23.900] Let me take the argument for the resurrection of Christ, just to show you. If I allow the unbeliever to reason in terms of his worldview, which he pretends is neutral, and then I present all these facts to show that Jesus very probably rose from the dead, if he accepts that conclusion within that worldview, he will have to conclude most certainly that Christianity is not true. Why is that? Well, because within his worldview, if Jesus rose from the dead, it’s because there’s some very odd principles that operate in the biological realm that we haven’t discovered yet. On his principles, that’s what it would have to be. He cannot accept that Jesus rose from the dead and then say it’s a miracle. Given his neutral method, he has to say, well, we’re not allowed to bring the supernatural in here. We have to say that’s a natural event.
[46:15.180] This allegedly neutral approach, of course, is not neutral. That’s Van Till’s point. You let him get away with using his method, his method will destroy you. It will destroy your worldview. Even when it appears he’s agreeing with points of your worldview, he will in fact have naturalized them and cut them down to size. If you allow him to use his neutral method, where he is the center of authority for what he believes and so forth, will he ever, if he’s consistent with that, say, God’s the center of authority for what I believe? See, God comes to him and says, I declare what you can believe, what you must believe. It’s not up to you. And who are you to talk back to God? Let God be true, though all men are liars. But you can never get to that conclusion if you begin with the idea of a neutral method where man is the ultimate authority over what he believes.
[47:03.700] So Van Till says, if you allow the unbeliever to continue with his pretended neutrality, you’re just going to reinforce his rejection of Christianity. What looks like an acceptance of points of the Christian system is in fact the destruction of those very points that have been received. I’m wondering, that’s not really true, that they wouldn’t do that. But a philosophical atheist, Kai Nielsen, actually said that very thing. It’s almost like, we took that right from Van Till. J.P. Moore, the name of the classic historical argument for resurrection, and he said, I grant that’s all true. What’s that prove? It doesn’t prove anything. It just proves something bizarre happened. We don’t know the answer yet. I couldn’t believe he said it, but he simply turned the whole argument right back on Moreland. And I don’t think that Moreland had a good response to that.
[47:48.320] Do you see a lay professor of physics saying the same thing? I’ve been told that, and I don’t know his name, and I can’t give you the context, and so I feel a little uneasy now using that illustration. When someone said one of the details, I said, well, I’ve been told that this guy, this physics professor, once said in class, he said, well, sure, you can say that historically Jesus rose from the dead, and now we’re looking for an explanation of it.
[48:10.820] So it’s immoral to use the evidential approach? I think it’s immoral to encourage people to sin. I think the evidential approach, in its neutral understanding, encourages people to try to be the ultimate authority. I believe that’s sinful, and so indirectly I have to say that that is in fact an immoral approach. It’s not immoral in the same way that the guy who goes to a prostitute says, I’m just going to now live licentiously. But it’s immoral in that it’s encouraging people to live contrary to faith in God by saying, first assume faith in yourself so that you might come to faith in God. Yes, if you just love yourself enough, you’ll have to end up loving God. If you just respect yourself enough, you’ll have to end up respecting God.
[48:58.580] All right, toward the bottom of page 118, Van Til talks about appealing to the knowledge of the true method, which the natural man knows but suppresses. Notice he says true method here. He’s not just appealing to the knowledge of the true God, or the truth about God and creation. But he says the natural man knows what the true method of thinking is, but he suppresses it. He knows that he should give glory to God and submit to his authority, but he suppresses it. The natural man at bottom knows that he is the creature of God. He knows also that he’s responsible to God. He knows that he should live to the glory of God. He knows that in all that he does, he should stress that the field of reality, which he investigates, has the stamp of God’s ownership upon it. But he suppresses his knowledge of himself as he truly is. He is the man with the iron mask, a true method of apologetics must seek to tear off that iron mask. Van Till had great illustrations. Here’s this guy who’s got this iron mask, you know, my job as an apologist is not to flatter the mask and say, you know, I think I can show in terms of the principles of your iron mask that there’s really a face behind that iron mask. Van Till says we need to tear that mask off, stop pretending to be autonomous, you’re not. The Roman Catholic and the Armenian make no attempt to do so. They even flatter the wearer about his fine appearance.
[50:28.800] Van Til’s being very kind here. You know, this is a very strong indictment because natural theology, the Roman Catholic approach, and even Arminian evidential apologetics, they’ll flatter the… You’re really doing very well when it comes to natural reasoning. You’re very good as a historian. You’re very good as a scientist. Van Til would say you couldn’t do anything that you’re doing if you didn’t already depend upon the God that you use your science and history to argue against. Anyway, they flatter his fine appearance. In the introductions of their books and apologetics, Arminian as well as Roman Catholic apologists frequently seek to set their opponents at ease by assuring them that their method in its field is all that any Christian could desire. Don’t get nervous. All I want you to do is apply the same method that you apply in that field that you’re familiar with. You know, if you’re a biologist or an astronomer or a physicist, psychologist, whatever. I’ll accept your method. I know you mean very well. You’re doing very well. It’s very fine.
[51:28.300] Flatter your neutrality. In contradistinction from this, the Reformed apologists will point out again and again that the only method that will lead to the truth in any field is that method which recognizes the fact that man is a creature of God, that he must therefore seek to think God’s thoughts after him. It is not as though the Reformed apologists should not interest himself in the nature of the non-Christian’s method. On the contrary, he should make a critical analysis of it. He should, as it were, join his friend in the use of it. But he should do so self-consciously with the purpose of showing that its most consistent application not merely leads away from Christian theism, but in leading away from Christian theism leads to the destruction of reason and science as well. That’s one of the most important sentences in all of Van Til’s writing. At least it was in my learning of the system. You know, then the coin drops and you say, oh yeah. What I want to show him is that if you’re consistent you can’t possibly be a Christian. But if you’re consistent, you can’t use logic and science either. In leading away from Christianity you lead away from the intelligibility of everything.
[52:39.820] And it may indicate more clearly what it’s meant. Suppose we think of a man made of water in an infinitely extended and bottomless ocean of water. Desiring to get out of the water he makes a ladder of water. He sets his ladder up upon the water and against the water and then attempts to climb out of the water. So hopeless and senseless a picture must be drawn of the natural man’s methodology based as it is upon the assumption that time or chance is ultimate. One of the easiest illustrations, at least for me, of this man of water is C.S. Lewis uses this as well. If the unbeliever is right that all we have is matter and motion. So that physics explains everything. Then the real question is I’m nothing more than just matter and motion. Just like the rock is matter and motion. How then do I ever as matter and motion get to the point where I think of myself as matter and motion? Rocks don’t think of themselves. How can self-consciousness be explained as matter and motion? That’s devastating. Van Til says on the unbeliever’s position everything’s water. Everything’s chance. Everything has these material characteristics. Well but then how do you take water and make a ladder that you can put against the water so that the man who is made out of the same stuff, water, can climb on the ladder of water out of the water? How do you rise above matter and motion to now be an intellect who can talk about matter and motion? Because you’re nothing but matter and motion. The non-Christian position destroys itself.
[54:27.800] On his assumption his own rationality is a product of chance. On his assumption even the laws of logic which he employs are products of chance. The rationality and purpose that he may be searching for are still bound to be products of chance. So then the Christian apologist whose position requires him to hold that Christian theism is really true and as such must be taken as the presupposition which alone makes the acquisition of knowledge in any field intelligible must join his friend in his hopeless gyrations so as to point out to him that his efforts are always in vain. It will then appear that Christian theism which was first rejected because of its supposed authoritarian character is the only position which gives human reason a field for successful operation and a method of true progress in knowledge.
[55:21.200] My math may be off but I think I’ve only read for you eight pages out of two books. It’s all there isn’t it? I think this is brilliant. It can be improved on. The expression of it might be cleaned up. But you know what? While I’m improving on Van Til’s Christian presuppositionalism I’m still being a Christian presuppositionalist aren’t I? Okay, what questions would you like to ask before I begin to go over the objections that people have raised against Van Til’s apologetic?
[55:50.280] Mark. Can you run it so a way that a child or someone branched into a client? That’s what I’m going to end with today if all goes well. The last objection is going to be well this is all too complicated. It’s too philosophical and I’m going to try to… Now don’t be like that. That wasn’t directed at anybody in our class. Lots of people read Van Til and they have trouble understanding him because he doesn’t write all that well. But once they understand it they say well but what good is that? How many Christians can use Kantian transcendental analysis and so forth? And so what I want to point out is that the same program is executable at a lower level even by children. And hopefully that’s where we’ll end up. Okay, other questions about this summary of the transcendental use—I mean the presuppositional use of transcendental analysis?
[56:44.080] You know before where the unbeliever proved the existence of air all the while reading it. Yeah, and it turns out I took that from Van Til. I actually had forgotten that I’d read that but I’ve run across it in writing this book on him again. A man may argue and sound very intelligent against the existence of air. The strange thing is all the while he argues against the existence of air he’s breathing while he’s doing his talking and arguing.
[57:17.200] And that picture I think is a good picture of the unbeliever and all of what he’s doing. He’s arguing against the Christian world view to be sure. And he may sound very brilliant at points. He may be very clever at points. And yet in order to argue at all he has to be assuming the Christian world view to argue against it. As Paul said, in him we live and move and have our being.
[57:39.200] What about the question that was asked the last minute about how extensive the Christian world view is. I mean you have to be a post-millennial and in a proper world view to use the transcendental argument. Okay, in order to use the transcendental argument most effectively you must believe in infant baptism.
[58:05.200] Why is that? Well, as I approach it because I think the Bible teaches infant baptism. Right? So if the truer we are to the source, to the foundation from which everything else makes sense, then the better will be our defense of the faith. So I want to say when somebody says, well do you have to believe in infant baptism to be a good presuppositionalist? I have to say, well to be the best presuppositionalist you do. Because I believe that’s what the Bible teaches. But then I would also say no you don’t.
[58:37.200] Because the illustration I used the other day is in football the guy who scores the touchdown is separate from the other players, isn’t he? Not everybody carries the ball into the end zone. But if we think that there aren’t secondary players that he needs for the whole team to operate, then we don’t understand how football is played. So the elements of the Christian worldview that are going to be the front line ball carriers in most arguments are going to be things having to do with the ontological Trinity, God’s foreordination, Christ being the incarnation of God, his death on the cross being for the redemption of men, the need of the Holy Spirit’s regeneration for thinking—these sorts of elements.
[59:25.200] But then when I just said regeneration there are different evangelical doctrines of regeneration. And so the better use of an appeal to regeneration would be one that sees it in its purest biblical light, and the same would be true in terms of covenant, what we do in response to God’s covenant. Do we raise our children acknowledging that all things belong to God? So forth and so on.
[59:45.200] Now I don’t want to make you Baptists feel uncomfortable, but presuppositionalism presses also for a covenant consciousness that demands that everything we do recognize the authority of God. And that means the way we raise our children. And we recognize the antithesis between those who are God’s people and those who are not God’s people. So our children are distinguished from the world and are raised to think all their thoughts after God. That isn’t because we control their hearts. They may grow up to be rebellious. Sadly, I have a child that has not lived faithfully and has been excommunicated. That breaks my heart.
[01:00:19.200] But I still raise my child as one who is to understand that she belongs to God. She is to think his thoughts after him and so forth. And that’s why she was set apart by God in baptism. We see that infant baptism ties in then with covenant consciousness, which ties in with the sovereignty of God and ties in with this Christian worldview that’s defended in that way.
[01:00:43.200] Please don’t feel bad if you don’t agree with infant baptism. I’m just trying to illustrate that though I don’t argue infant baptism with the unbeliever, you know, back there a ways that’s still part of my team. I didn’t score this touchdown without that implicitly being part of the system. Now we may all get together on the team and say, now do we want this person to be the guard or not? We may think we can improve on our effort. We’ve scored a lot of touchdowns as a football team but maybe we ought to get rid of infant baptism and put this other one into place. But we’re still as a football team deciding how we operate as a football team. So it’s kind of like a broad focus rather than a narrow focus as I see it.
[01:01:23.200] The narrow focus is what does the work in apologetics but it always assumes that broader focus, and that broader focus can be refined and can be made more precise. …Doesn’t Dr. Van Til used an analogy of the military—the big guns, apologists being the errand boy between systematic theology and other fields of study. Yeah.
[01:01:47.200] The point is too that we’re defending the whole system we call Christianity, again not the blockhouse method, not just these ten things, but the whole package that makes up our world. Right. Totally.
[01:02:01.200] Now is it destructive for us to admit to the unbeliever that because we are finite creatures of God, we admit that even as Christians we are growing in our precision of understanding of what God has told us? In one sense that’s advantageous. Not because we have a copy out later if there’s something wrong with what we said. It’s advantageous because we want to tell the unbeliever that the only transcendental, the only final authority, is God.
[01:02:31.200] And therefore the fact that we don’t have this infallibility of interpretation and we have to work on refining the details is just an indication that it’s not our authority that we’re standing on but on God’s. But we couldn’t even refine our Christian theology if we didn’t already know transcendentally that it was true.
[01:02:53.200] Van Til’s image, and again we use metaphors, how valuable is that? You decide. But I like this. I think it gets the point across. Van Til says if you’re trying to go across a swollen river where the bridge is under eight inches of water, you’ve got to get your car to the other side.
[01:03:11.200] Granted, as you go across that bridge, you’re being real careful, aren’t you? Because you can’t see the surface of the bridge. There’s eight inches of water there. You can’t get to the other side.
[01:03:23.200] Well, take the situation: somebody says, well, since you can’t see the surface of the bridge, you don’t know exactly what the bridge looks like and where it is. You might as well ford the river anywhere. Well, that doesn’t make any sense, does it?
[01:03:35.200] Van Til says, granted, we don’t see all the details. We’re still working on textual criticism and things of that nature. But it makes all the difference in the world epistemologically that there’s a bridge under us when we try to cross than that we are the man of water made of water with a ladder of water.
[01:03:53.200] Okay? You don’t try to cross that bridge, I mean, you don’t try to cross that river without a bridge. So we’ve got a bridge, but we are finite and imperfect and we’re still working on seeing it more perfectly.
[01:04:05.200] It is consistent in our worldview. It is not inconsistent in the Christian worldview that we are working on our theology progressively. That doesn’t contradict. In fact, it fits into what we know about the nature of man. When will we know, even as we are known, after all? Not in this life. Not until later.
[01:04:25.200] Okay, five minute break.
- Four Types of Proof (1 of 10)
- Van Til’s Why I Believe in God (2 of 10)
- Kant in Context (3 of 10)
- Contemporary Transcendental Arguments, Part 1 (4 of 10)
- Contemporary Transcendental Arguments, Part 2 (5 of 10)
- Summary of Transcendental Arguments, Part 1 (6 of 10)
- Summary of Transcendental Arguments, Part 2 (7 of 10)
- Apologetical Transcendental Argument (8 of 10)
- Back to Basics (9 of 10)
- Van Til’s Critics: Hoover, Dooyeweerd, Frame (10 of 10)
