0:00 …One Thing You Need To Know Of The Previous Discussion About Sir Peter Strawson’s Transcendental Argument Is That It’s CONCEPTUAL In Nature, Not ONTOLOGICAL (He’s Saying That—VIA A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME—Human Beings View The World In A Certain Type Of Way & Not That The World IS THIS WAY)
0:34 Strawson’s Argument Attempts To Show The SKEPTIC’s Doubt Is Going Against A PRECONDITION Of Viewing The World, And Therefore, Constitutes It Being A False Doubt; & It Makes No Sense…However, Strawson Has Not Proven That Things Continue To Exist Unperceived By This Argument.
1:47 In Order To PROVE That Things Continue To Exist Unperceived Strawson Needed Another Argument. NOTE – Having A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT Doesn’t Necessarily Mean It Is A Good TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT (@31:06 & @ 33:58, Michael Butler & Greg Bahnsen Go Into Detail About This)
2:11 Professor Barry Stroud (Berkeley) Critiques Strawson’s Argument
2:32 NOTE: MB is referring to the PREVIOUS LECTURE @ 1:02:12 —Strawson Turns To The Hub Of His Argument (LAYS IT OUT IN THE TYPICAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FORM) — For “X” To Be The Case “Y”Would Have To Be The Case, “BECAUSE””Y” Is A Precondition Of “X.””X”IS THE CASE, SO “Y” IS THE CASE. — “BECAUSE” Is Proven By A REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM ARGUMENT. TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS Try To Show That If You Didn’t Have “Y” Then You Couldn’t Have “X.” So You Assume, Not “Y.” And You Show That, Starting With Not “Y,”That You Couldn’t Have “X.”
3:01 NOT “Y”…Assumes That We Never Believe That Particular Things Had Continue Existence Through Times When We Don’t Observe Them
4:03 “X”…If “Y” Would Not Be The Case “X” Would Not Be The Case …Every Time We Had An Experience, I Would Assume It Was In A Different Spatial Scheme.
5:45 MB Expands On The Aforementioned Argument — “If I never reidentified what sense would it make for me to say that, I have one idea of a single spatial continuum, and yet I’m never willing to identify some things in a new experience with something in a previous experience. What sense would that make?”
6:12 NOT “X” (…THE REDUCTIO)
6:51 MB Recaps Strawson’s Argument (EMPHASIS ON IT BEING CONCEPTUAL IN NATURE) …(Brilliant, Yet Falls Short) …MB Opens The Floor To Questions Before Moving Forward
7:43 QUESTION: Why Does The Skeptic Have To Presuppose “Y” …ANSWER: Because The Skeptic Has Already Accepted, And Is Committed To, “X” … The Class Expands On The Answer…
10:21 MB Expands Upon The Skeptic Denying “X” …Monty Python Analogy
11:10 MB Explains NOT “Y” One More Time …You Would Never Have A Concept Of A “UNITY OF A SPATIAL SCHEME” If You Believed That Particular Things Don’t Continue To Exist Through Times When We Don’t Observe Them
12:37 Barry Stroud’s 1967 Article, TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS (Argues Against Strawson’s Transcendental Argument) …For Later Discussion MB Mentions: THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE; And The Possible Impact On VAN TILLIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS (MB Bellieves It Has No Impact Whatsoever)
13:20 Stroud Takes Stawson’s Argument To Have Three Premises & A Conclusion. The Conclusion Is, Objects Continue To Exist Unperceived….Though, Stroud Misinterprets Strawson’s Argument, He Still Has Some Good Criticisms Against ONTOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS…
14:06 PREMISE 1
14:28 PREMISE 2
14:58 PREMISE 3
15:22 MB Expands On Stroud’s Conclusion Being A Non Sequitur
16:13 PREMISE 4
16:42 PREMISE 5
18:41 THE VERIFICATIONIST PRINCIPLE – Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is the philosophical doctrine which asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it is either empirically verifiable (i.e. confirmed through the senses) or a truth of logic (e.g., tautologies) — (Source: Wikipedia)
20:12 John 3:16 & The Verification Principle
21:19 Michael Martin (Greg Bahnsen’s Debate Opponent Who Backed Out) Held To Some Version Of The Verificationist Principle…So, What’s The Problem With It? (ANSWER: IT DOESN’T LIVE UP TO ITS OWN CRITERIA)
22:20 QUESTION: What Is An Analytical Statement? It Is Something Wherein The Concept Of The PREDICATE Is Contained In The Concept Of The SUBJECT. EXAMPLES: The Concept Of An Unmarried Male—PREDICATE, Is Already Contained In The SUBJECT—Bachelor…Socrates Is A Man Predicates Manhood Of Socrates)
23:10 Back To Stroud, Who—Thinks Strawson Is Committed To A Verificationist Principle—Deems Strawson’s So Called Transcendental Argument Unnecessary, Because The Verification Principal Will Directly Refute The Skeptic
23:56 MB Examines Why Stroud Believes Strawson Is Committed To A Verification Principal…Believes Strawson Made An Ontological Claim About Objects Continuing To Exist Unperceived And Must Tie His Concepts & Nail Them Down To The World…HENCE, THE VERIFICATIONIST PRINCIPAL (THAT’S WHAT IT’S SUPPOSED TO DO)
25:18 According To Stroud, THE VERIFICATIONIST PRINCIPAL MAKES THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT UNNECESSARY…Because If The State Of Affairs Are Deemed To Be Meaningful By It (Corresponds With What We Experience In The World), The Skeptic Is Defeated Directly Without The Need Of An Indirect Transcendental Argument.
26:29 GREG BAHNSEN COMES IN TO SIMPLIFY STROUD’S POSITION OF VERIFICATIONIST PRINCIPAL Vs. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT…GLB Is Referencing The Previous Lecture: TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS (3 of 10) —KANT IN CONTEXT…The Verificationist Principal Is A Variation Of PERCEPTUAL FOUNDATION Which Is A Version Of FOUNDATIONALISM…(Some Background) FOUNDATIONALISM Unites Various Epistemologies Which Want To Eliminate Abitrariness In Our Thinking, Also Prejudice, Relativism, Unwarranted Conjecture. It Attempts To Attain Cognitive Certainty By Anchoring Belief In Some Type Of Foundation Of Unassailable Propositions.(TIMESTAMP 54:11)
27:45 COMMENTS FROM THE CLASS – You Need The Transcendental Approach Or Argument (Van Til’s Version) To Substantiate The Verification Principal.
27:59 Back To Stroud’s Belief, MB Expands…
28:58 GLB COMES IN TO CLARIFY STROUD’S POSITION IN MISUNDERSTANDING STRAWSON’S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT, “He’s Just Trying To Show That Strawson Is Wasting Time, If I Can Put It Bluntly.” … MB EXPANDS, Though Stroud Is Wrong About Strawson’s True Position, It Should Be Noted That Stroud Still Makes A Good Argument Against What He Thinks Is Strawson’s Form Of Transcendental Argument.
30:41 MB Brings This Part Of The Lecture To A Close For A Break … Up Next …Opens The Floor For Questions/Comments
31:06 COMMENTS FROM THE CLASS – The Problem With Strawson’s Transcendental Argument Vs. Van Til’s Transcendental Argument … (Preparatory Remarks: Having A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT Doesn’t Necessarily Mean It Is A Good TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT)
33:58 GREG BAHNSEN – OFFERING AN ARGUMENT Vs. OFFERING A GOOD ARGUMENT “… Many times people fall into the trap of thinking that well if you’re offering a Transcendental Argument then it’s got to be true. Well, no. It could be a bad Transcendental Argument. And Van Til, to get to the punchline, is going to say, the unbeliever can try to argue Transcendentally but he can never succeed. Only we (Christians) can (Because CHRIST Is Our Ultimate Starting Point, Making Sense Of Metaphysics, Epistemology, & Ethics: M.E.E.).
36:02 RECAP (PART 1&2 OF CONTEMPORARY TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS)
37:12 A. C. Grayling, “Transcendental Arguments” in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology … HE DEMONSTRATES PHILOSOPHERS USE OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
37:22 (* PLEASE NOTE THAT COVENANT MEDIA’S VERSION OF THIS LECTURE IS MISSING A FEW SENTENCES ABOUT A.C. GRAYLING BEING A BRITISH PHILOSOPHER WHO DEFENDS A VERSION OF STRAWSON’S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS. This Edited Presentation Was Taken From The CMF Source Audio.)
37:43 MB Comments On Grayling’s Thoughts About Philosopher Immanuel Kant’s Transcendental Arguments Being Merely Skepticism Refuting Arguments
38:16 MB Resumes Reading A. C. Grayling
39:29 MB Comments On Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, And The Argument In His Most Famous Book, THE INVESTIGATIONS, About The Possibility Of A Private Language Being Impossible. …With What Grayling Saw As A Version Of A Transcendental Argument, Refuted SOLIPSISM—the philosophical theory that the self is all that you know to exist.
41:10 J. L. Austin (British philosopher) Argues Transcendentally For Formulating A Theory Of Truth By Distinguishing Between Demonstrative And Descriptive Conventions In Language
41:30 Gilbert Ryle (British Philosopher) …His Use Of Polar Concept Arguments * More Can Be Found At TIMESTAMP 42:35 Of Part 4 In This Series TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS.
42:06 MB Comments On Grayling Laying Out That This Form Of Argumentation (The Transcendental Argument) Has Historical Precedence … But He Explains Later That They Are Not Quite Transcendental Arguments Because Of Their Scope …MB Refers To Part 4 In This Series, TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS, Timestamp 41:04 (SMALL & LARGE SCOPE ARGUMENTS)
43:43 MB Pauses To Open The Floor To Questions
43:45 THE CLASS ASKS ABOUT THE SCOPE ISSUE REGARDING TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS…MB Explains That The Rule Of Thumb Is, If It Has A Major Impact On Our Conceptual Scheme, Our Outlook On The World, Then That Concept Is A Transcendental (CONDITION OF EXPERIENCE) And So Any Argument That Trys To Establish That Is A Transcendental Argument …MB Gives Examples
44:41 GREG BAHNSEN COMES IN (AUDIO ISSUES) … Van Til Posited That Transcendental Arguments Must Be WORLDVIEW WIDE… Something Like Rene Descartes’ Cogito, Ergo Sum (Is A Kind Of Transcendental Argument), By Itself Isn’t Going To Do Anything To Make Knowledge Possible…All Such Individual Arguments Must Be Pushed Out To A WORLDVIEW LEVEL
45:22 MB Expands On The Philosophical Issue Of, THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS & How The Skeptic Forces Philosophers To Develop An Epistemology & Give An Account Of How They Know What They Know. THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological question: Given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds? The problem is that knowledge of other minds is always indirect. (Source: Wikipedia)
46:54 An EMPIRICIST Has A Problem Justifying Other Minds…The Only Evidence He/She Has To Go On Is Behavior & Arguments From Analogy
47:27 Transcendental Arguments Have Been Made Regarding THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS. Strawson’s Position On This Issue Resembles His Previous Arguments…
48:23 MB Continues Reading A. C. Grayling …Classic Contemporary Examples Of Transcendental Arguments Are To Be Found In Peter Frederick Strawson’s, INDIVIDUALS: An Essay In Descriptive Metaphysics. (THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS)
50:14 MB Summarizes The Reading (Strawson Is Using The Same Form Of Argumentation) …We Ascribe States Of Affairs To Ourselves (That We Have Certain States Of Affairs)…The Precondition of That Is That We Have The Ability To Ascribe Them To Others. If We Can Ascribe Them To Others, We Must Have A Criteria For Ascribing States Of Affairs To Others. And If You Deny That, You Wouldn’t Be Able To Ascribe States Of Affairs To Yourself. Therefore, It Wouldn’t Make Sense To Question The Existence Of Other Minds.
51:01 MB Resumes Reading A. C. Grayling …Another Transcendental Argument Of Strawson’s Concerns, PARTICULARS.
52:07 MB Summarizes The Reading – Grayling Is Saying There Are Two Types Of Transcendental Arguments: THE ONTOLOGICAL & THE CONCEPTUAL. (MB Discussed Adding A Third: THE KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT; And A Fourth: A WORLDVIEW VAN TILLIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT)
52:31 MB Expands On Grayling Positing There’s A Difficulty With THE CONCEPTUAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT…How Do You Prove That There’s Not More Than One Conceptual Scheme? MB Revisits The Previous Lecture’s Illustration Of A TELEVISION Being Interpreted By People From Different Backgrounds, TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS Part4 @ 12:13
55:11 THE CLASS RESPONDS … Grayling And Relative Arguments Leading To Skepticism
55:24 Grayling’s NON-ONTOLOGICAL, THE CONCEPTUAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS aka “OPTION B TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS” Only Lead To Relativistic Conclusions…THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE NOT DEFEATED THE SKEPTIC BECAUSE THEY LEAVE THE SKEPTIC AN OUT.
57:40 MB Continues Reading A. C. Grayling Who Proceeds To Show THE DIFFICULTIES OF BOTH THE ONTOLOGICAL & CONCEPTUAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS IN DEFEATING THE SKEPTIC … OPTION “A” & “B” AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD
59:11 QUESTION: MB, What’s Your Definition Of THE EXTERNAL WORLD? (Answer: It’s Simply The Independent Existence Of The World Outside Of Yourself) …A BRAIN IN A VAT: THE SKEPTICAL DOUBT OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.
1:00:22 MB Resumes Reading A. C. Grayling … OPTION “A” & “B” AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD (CONTINUED)
1:03:00 MB Mentions (“Odd Ball Philosopher”) Richard Rorty … OPTION “B”
1:04:22 MB Reading A. C. Grayling – CONCEPTUAL TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS (CRITIQUED IN MORE DETAIL)
1:06:32 MB Highlights Philosopher Donald Davidson’s Discussions Of The Nature Of CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES & THAT OURS IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME.
1:07:25 MB Wraps Up With A Preview Of The Next Lecture: Donald Davidson’s Observations & How Grayling Applies Them….MB Will Show Where Grayling Had Problems With Them….And Finally Concluding On The Relationship Between The Contemporary Debate & The Worldview Transcendental Argument Of Cornelius Van Til
- Four Types of Proof (1 of 10)
- Van Til’s Why I Believe in God (2 of 10)
- Kant in Context (3 of 10)
- Contemporary Transcendental Arguments, Part 1 (4 of 10)
- Contemporary Transcendental Arguments, Part 2 (5 of 10)
- Summary of Transcendental Arguments, Part 1 (6 of 10)
- Summary of Transcendental Arguments, Part 2 (7 of 10)
- Apologetical Transcendental Argument (8 of 10)
- Back to Basics (9 of 10)
- Van Til’s Critics: Hoover, Dooyeweerd, Frame (10 of 10)
